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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing concern 
with the funding of education in the United States. Ques­
tions have been raised about the way it is financed, the 
level of financing, and the impact of government aid on 
local funding. Since the turn of the twentieth century, 
expenditures for education have assumed a growing budget­
ary importance. At all levels of government, educational 
expenditures have increased both absolutely and as a per­
centage of total spending since 1902. From 1902 to 1975, 
federal educational spending has increased from 0.7% to 
4.8% of total spending, while state and local spending for 
education increased from 23.3% to 33.0% of total spending 
by those governmental units. For all three governments, 
educational expenditures rose from 15.4% to 17.1% over the 
period.^
Some educational spending is indirect and is in the
^U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the 
U.S., Colonial Times to 1970 and U.S. Census Bureau, Gov- 
ernmental Finance, 1974-75, cited by Thomas F. Pogue and 
L. G. Sgontz, Government and Economic Choice: An Introduc­
tion to Public Finance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1978), pp. 36-38.
2form of a transfer from a higher to a lower governmental 
unit. Such outlays have increased. For example, in Okla­
homa, state aid to education increased from $500,000 for 
fiscal 1925 to $224,748,186 in fiscal 1976.^ The impact of 
such intergovernmental transfers is not clear, and a body 
of theoretical and empirical work has centered on defini­
tion and measurement of this impact. The determination of 
whether state aid to education in Oklahoma encourages or 
discourages local funding is a major objective of this study.
The issue of state aid stimulating or discouraging 
local spending for education in Oklahoma is an important 
issue on two counts. First, an examination of item six of 
the Oklahoma School Code addressed the importance of en­
couragement.^ Section 18-101 of the Oklahoma School Code 
reads as follows in regard to legislative intent.
The Legislature hereby declares that this act is 
passed for the general improvement of the public schools 
in the State of Oklahoma; to provide the best possible 
educational opportunities for every child in Oklahoma; 
and to have a more beneficial use of public funds ex­
pended for education; and this act shall be liberally 
construed to attain these goals within the purview of 
the following principles and policies:
6. The system, of public school support should en­
courage local school districts to provide and support 
improved educational programs.^
2
1975-76 Annual Report, Oklahoma State Department 
of Education by Leslie Fisher, State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction (Oklahoma City: Allied Printers and
Publishers, Inc., 1976), pp. 29-31.
^Oklahoma, Statutes, Annotated (West Publishing 
Company, 1972).
^Ibid.
3Second, the encouragement of local districts to support 
improved educational programs is justified by the efficient 
allocation of resource argument expressed above. Since pos­
itive externalities result from education purchased by the 
local school district, state aid should encourage an in­
creased purchase to move the school district toward a so­
cially efficient equilibrium.
Another question to be addressed deals with which 
components of state funding produce stimulation, if any? 
State revenues passed down to local levels are in the form 
of foundation aid, incentive aid, and dedicated revenues. 
Which of these stimulates local educational funding and 
which acts as a substitute for local effort?
Since stimulation of local educational spending is 
a desirable goal for state aid, an evaluation of the rela­
tive success of various components in accomplishing this 
goal is necessary. To this end of evaluation the effective­
ness of state foundation aid, state incentive aid, and state 
dedicated revenue, each of their effects on local spending 
must be measured.
The Oklahoma Statutes establish another purpose of 
state aid to education as the equalization of educational 
opportunity.^ Does state aid to education assist in equal­
izing educational opportunity in Oklahoma?
An examination of item nine of the Oklahoma School
^Ibid.
4Code indicates that equalization of educational opportunity
is a goal of public school finance.
9. State support should be extended to all local
districts regardless of wealth, for this not only de­
velops a sense of broader responsibility, but also 
creates flexibility taxwise permitting the exercise 
of local initiative. State support should, to assure 
equal educational opportunity, provide for as large a 
measure of equalization as possible among districts.
The taxing power of the state should be utilized to 
raise the level of educational opportunity in the fi­
nancially weakest districts of the state.®
Besides the Oklahoma Statutes, several court cases 
have recently called attention to the equalization of edu­
cational spending within state boundaries, e.g., in Cali­
fornia, Serrano v. Priest^ and in Texas, Rodriguez v. San
g
Antonio Independent School District.
The Serrano v. Priest case centered on the argument 
that fourteenth amendment rights of the U.S. Constitution 
had been violated. Public schools in California were fi­
nanced in such a manner as to discriminate against those 
who lived in poorer districts, i.e., property taxes were 
heavily relied upon. Further, higher tax rates had to be
^Ibid.
^Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), cited by Betsy Levin, Alternatives 
to the Present System of School Finance; Their Problems and 
Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1973), p. 895.
g
Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dis­
trict, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W. D. Texas 1971), prob. juris noted, 
406 U.S. 966 (1972) (No. 71-1332), cited by Betsy Levin, M -  
ternatives to the Present System of School Finance: Their
Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute,
1973), pp. 896-897.
5paid in the poorer districts to maintain a comparable level 
of education to other areas of the state. The case was 
appealed to the California Supreme Court and their ruling 
follows. There is a constitutional right to an education 
the quality of which is not "a function of the wealth of 
. . . "  the pupil's neighborhood. This principle of "fiscal 
neutrality" requires that "the level of spending for a 
child's education . . . not be a function of wealth other
Û
than the wealth of the state as a whole."
Although what is trying to be equalized with respect 
to the quality of education is an important issue, it will 
not be part of this study. The assumption will be made 
that quality of education is measured by total educational 
revenue per student in average daily attendance in a par­
ticular district.
With the Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School 
District case fourteenth amendment rights were claimed. A 
lower court ruling was in favor of Rodriguez, based on the 
fiscal neutrality doctrine. The Supreme Court overturned 
the lower court ruling and said that the "constitutional
9
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), cited by Betsy Levin, Alterna­
tives to the Present System of School Finance: Their Prob­
lems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute),
1973), pp. 895-896.
James S. Coleman, "Equal Schools or Equal Students," 
Public Interest 4 (Summer 1966): 70-75.
authority precluded" the lower court ruling.
Following Serrano v. Priest and Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Independent School District there have been fifty-
12two such actions in thirty-one states. Even following the 
Supreme Court decision against Rodriguez the pressure re­
mains strong to correct the discrimination in educational 
funding which ties quality of education and wealth together. 
Not only is the concern still strong in favor of the fiscal 
neutrality doctrine, but widespread concern exists with re­
gard to funding education through the property tax. During 
the last five years, issues such as full-state funding of 
education, reducing dependence of educational funds on pro­
perty wealth, and shifting of the property tax base through 
a redistribution of public service property tax revenues 
have been of concern in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Legislature 
has shown concern by recently proposing a law which would 
redistribute the public service part of the property tax. 
(See Appendix 1 for a draft of this proposed legislation.)
The purposes of this study are to, first, determine 
the impact of state grants on local resource allocation to
^^Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dis­
trict, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W. D. Texas 1971), prob. juris 
noted, 406 U.S. 966 (1972) (No. 71-1332), cited by Betsy 
Levin, Alternatives to the Present System of School Finance; 
Their Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Urban
Institute, 1973), pp. 396-897.
12
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241, 
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), cited by Betsy Levin, Alternatives 
to the Present System of School Finance: Their Problems and
Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1973),p. 896.
7education and, second, to determine how educational oppor­
tunity is affected by state grants to education in Oklahoma. 
Relevant to the first purpose is the question, do state 
grants stimulate or discourage local funding of education 
in Oklahoma? Purpose one will be dealt with by employing 
multiple regression analysis to a demand equation for edu­
cation. The impact of total state educational revenue on 
local funding of education will be estimated. Next, the 
impact of block and matching grants will be isolated. Pur­
pose two will be dealt with by testing a simple regression 
model, first, to see if educational opportunity is related to 
district wealth and, second, to determine the impact of state 
educational funding on the equality of educational oppor­
tunity. (A more complete explanation of purpose and method 
is present in Chapter IV.)
This study will proceed along the following lines. 
Chapter II will summarize the literature on the impact of 
grants on state and local funding of education. Chapter III 
will outline the collection and expenditure system for state 
educational monies in Oklahoma. Chapter IV will outline the 
models to be tested and the formal hypotheses which will be 
tested to address the relevant questions raised. Chapter V 
will present a discussion of issues concerning the testing 
of hypotheses established in Chapter IV. The final chapter 
will summarize the empirical work and set forth conclusions 
derived. It also will touch on the need and the desired
8direction for further work in this particular area of the 
grants economy.
CHAPTER II
SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON ECONOMICS 
OF GRANTS IN AID
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and 
assess the major studies that measure the impact of inter­
governmental grants for education. Attention will focus 
principally on the objectives, methods employed, conclu­
sions, and gaps left for further work. Thirteen studies 
were chosen for explanation because their demand equations 
for education utilized a wide range of independent vari­
ables, including state and/or federal aid.
Several studies have explored the impact of state 
and federal grants on local and state spending for educa­
tion. Some of the demand models have used state and federal 
aid as independent variables to help explain local funding 
of education. Others of these educational demand models 
have employed state or federal aid as independent variables. 
Objectives of most of the studies involved measuring the 
stimulative versus substitution effects of intergovernmental 
grants for education. Methods of the researchers varied 
in regard to the independent variables list and the way the
9
10
dependent variable was specified. The number of independent
variables employed ranged from three in Bishop's work^ to
2
ten in Ladd's model. The dependent variable was often 
specified to be local or state spending for education,^ but 
in some cases total educational spending was regressed on 
a list of independent variables/*
Few of these models examined measured the relative 
impact of block versus matching grants. Block grants re­
quire no direct effort on the part of the recipient govern­
ment, while matching grants do require direct financing 
effort on the part of the government unit receiving the 
grant. Block and matching grants have differing impacts 
on the budget constraint of the government unit receiving 
these awards. (This issue of block versus matching grants 
will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV.) While the 
relative impact of block and matching grants is a question 
of importance, it has not been dealt with adequately.
^George Bishop, "Stimulative Versus Substitution 
Effects of State School Aid in New England," National Tax 
Journal 17 (June 1964); 137.
2
Helen F. Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures,
Fiscal Capacity, and the Composition of the Property Tax 
Base," National Tax Journal 28 (June 1975): 148.
^Robert Anthony Gough, Jr., "Intergovernmental 
Grants-in-Aid: A General Model for Assessing the Local
Fiscal Effects of the Massachusetts Variable-Matching 
Public School Aid Program." (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke 
University, 1974), p. 21.
*Ladd, p. 148.
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None of the models broke federal aid down into its component 
parts of matching and block grants. Only two studies in 
1975 broke state aid down into its matching and block com­
ponents . ^ ®
Most of the studies of state and federal aid impact 
on local educational spending have involved regression 
analysis. Multiple linear regression by ordinary least- 
squares has been the most popular, using linear or log- 
linear forms. Some have used two-stage least-squares or 
principal components analysis.
A variety of results emerged from these aid studies. 
State aid was usually found to stimulate local spending 
for education, although two models have found it insignifi­
cant and one found that it discouraged local spending for 
education. Federal aid was found to stimulate local spend­
ing in five studies, while three found it not significant.
Five of the studies examined utilized both state 
and federal aid to help explain local educational spending. 
Two of this group of five studies used only total state 
and federal aid.
David N. Holland's study employed a time series of
^Ladd, p. 148.
^Martin S. Feldstein, "Wealth Neutrality and Local 
Choice in Public Education," American Economic Review 65 
(March 1975): 80-81.
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Oklahoma data for the years of 1951 to 1970.^ It aggregated 
school districts into counties and proceeded with data for 
seventy-seven Oklahoma counties. State revenue per student 
was found to have a negative impact on local spending for 
education; federal aid per student was not significant.
Other significant variables in the Holland study and their 
impacts are as follows: income per student (positive),
dummy variable designating western Oklahoma with a one and 
eastern Oklahoma with a zero (positive), public school en­
rollment per the population (positive), and non-white en­
rollment per the total enrollment (positive). Net migration 
was the main concern to Holland, and this variable was found 
to have no effect on local educational revenue.
A second study which used both state and federal 
aid to education without a breakdown was done by George B.
O
Pidot, Jr. The data base for this work was eighty large 
standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSA's) throughout 
the United States for 1962. Principal components analysis 
was used by Pidot, mainly to by-pass the potential problem 
of multicollinearity. Six principal components were derived
"^David William Holland, "The Geographic and Income 
Class Distribution of the Benefits and Costs of Public Edu­
cation— Implications for Common School Finance." (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1972), p. 56.
O
George B. Pidot, Jr. "A Principal Components Anal­
ysis of the Determinants of Local Government Fiscal Pat­
terns," Review of Economics and Statistics 51 (May 1969): 
187.
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and then combined with state and federal aid per capita as 
independent variables on which current educational spending 
per capita was regressed. Two principal components were 
not significant in explaining current educational spending. 
Four components were found to affect the dependent variable 
negatively: metropolitanism, inverse measure of wealth,
absence of older and lower income people and the presence 
of manufacturing rather than retailing, and representative 
of areas of high residential rather than commercial prop­
erty. Areas with those four characteristics tended to 
spend less on current education per capita. The metropoli­
tanism component captured areas such as New York City, 
Washington, D.C., and Boston as compared to areas such as 
Phoenix, Fresno, and San Jose. Areas producing high prin­
cipal component scores for metropolitanism had a high pop­
ulation density, slow or negative growth rates, large 
suburban agglomerations, and a commuting labor force using 
public transport. Inverse measure of wealth as a component 
showed negative impact on the dependent variable when re­
gression was employed. The inverse measure of wealth was 
highly negatively correlated with income measures and with 
the indices of good housing quality. Also characteristic 
in this category were low amounts of value added in manu­
facturing and a high positive correlation with size of gov­
ernmental units. By this inverse measure of wealth Rochester 
and San Francisco were labeled wealthy and at the other
14
extreme were Mobile and Memphis. The last two of the four 
components with negative influence defy such exacting iden­
tification as did metropolitanism and inverse measure of 
wealth. Areas with tendencies toward absence of older and 
lower income people and the presence of manufacturing rather 
than retailing produced lower per capita revenues for cur­
rent education. Also, areas characterized with high resi­
dential development as opposed to commercial development 
had relatively lower property values and tended to spend 
less per capita on current education. State aid per capita 
produced a regression coefficient of + 0.323 and, thus, had 
a stimulative influence on local spending. Federal aid per 
capita and the principal component described as a general 
inverse index of size produced insignificant regression co­
efficients.
A third study to involve state and not federal aid 
in the explanation of educational spending was produced by
9
Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris. The purpose of this work 
was to compare results of Fabricant and Fisher with a simi­
lar result in 1960.^^'^^ Sacks and Harris used data for
9
Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants 
of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovern­
mental Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal 17 (March 1964): 
83-84.
Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity 
in the United States Since 1900 (New York: National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1952), pp. 112-139.
^^Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local 
Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," National
Tax Journal 14 (December 1961): 349-355.
15
the forty-eight states of the United States for 1942, 1957, 
and 1960. The dependent variable involved in this multiple 
linear regression was per capita state and local spending 
for local schools. Independent variables were few, namely: 
population density per square mile for 1960, per capita in­
come in 1960, and per capita state aid in 1960 dollars.
State aid was found to be a major determinant of state and 
local spending for education. A major flaw in the Sacks 
and Harris work was the use of state aid to education as 
an independent variable since it is also part of the depen­
dent variable, state and local spending for education. A 
degree of circularity is introduced into the regression 
when this procedure is followed.
Another work which involved the use of both state
and federal aid to explain local spending for education was
12done by Helen F. Ladd. Ladd not only employed state and 
federal grants to education, but these were separately viewed 
in three variables. A local tax share variable was used to 
measure the effect of state matching aid. Non-matching 
state aid was accounted for in a unique variable. Categoric 
grants from both state and federal governments were esti­
mated in another independent variable.
Ladd's data base was the Boston SMSA for 1970. Ladd 
used a log form for her regressions and, thus, directly es­
timated relevant elasticities. Results of this study can
^^Ladd, p. 148.
16
be summarized as follows. Elasticity with regard to state 
block grants was found to be significant and positive (0.030 
to 0.0386). State matching grants stimulate educational 
spending. Categoric grants, federal and state combined, 
stimulate educational spending. It should be noted that 
Ladd's dependent variable is total educational spending per 
student, i.e., local, state, and federal. Other findings 
of Ladd which do not involve state and federal aid's impact 
on educational spending include income and wealth elastici­
ties; both were positive and significant (0.42 to 0.459) 
and (0.239 to 0.30), respectively. Thus, income and wealth 
were both found to stimulate total educational spending per 
pupil. The price elasticity for the residential portion 
of the tax base was estimated to be - 0.31; thus, the higher 
the fraction of residential property in the tax base the 
lower was the spending for education. The price elasticity 
for the local share component of the tax base was negative 
and significant, (- 0.49). This implies that the greater 
the burden is for localities to finance education, the less 
energetic they are to spend for education.
Perhaps, the most outstanding work of the studies 
examined was that of Martin S. Feldstein which involved 
cross-sectional data for 1970 in Massachusetts.^^ The 
Feldstein study was used by the writer of this dissertation 
as a guide for testing the wealth neutrality hypothesis—
^^Feldstein, pp. 75-89.
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established by court cases like Serrano v. Priest— that the 
spending per student for education was not to be related to 
the wealth of the school district in which the student re­
sides.
Feldstein regressed current educational expenditures 
per pupil (local, state, and federal) on nine independent 
variables. Of particular interest in the Feldstein model 
were variables for price = (1 - local matching rate). This 
variable refers to the price of an educational expenditure 
to the local district, i.e., one minus the portion paid by 
the state. If the matching rate was twenty-five percent, 
then a 0.75 price to the local district would result. State 
block grants was another component of state aid to education. 
Federal grants were viewed in lump sum form, i.e., no sep­
aration was made as to block, categoric, or matching funds. 
Representative results of the Feldstein work allow several 
comments in summary. Elasticity with respect to wealth is 
low, (0.28). Price elasticity is high, (- 1.0). Income 
elasticity is low, (0.48). Elasticity with respect to 
state block grants is low and less than federal grants,
(0.066 and 0.136), respectively. Thus, state block grants 
stimulate total educational spending, but less than fed­
eral grants. The residential portion of the tax base pro­
duced a negative coefficient, which suggests that non- 
residential taxes are considered to be less costly than
14
Serrano v. Priest, L. A= 29820, Superior Court 
No. 938254 (1971), cited by Feldstein, p. 77%
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residential taxes. A large number of private school stu­
dents tends to depress public school spending; an elasticity 
of (- 1.112) was produced. A growth in the number of pu­
pils causes the level of per pupil spending to go down; the 
elasticity coefficient was (- 0.336). The contribution of 
the Feldstein work lies in his use of the price variable 
which works in the effect of state matching grants. Most 
studies have worked with dollar amounts and have ignored 
the price effect of state matching grants.
Four studies observed used state aid as an indepen­
dent variable in trying to explain educational spending.
One such study was done by George Bishop, who worked with 
six New England states for the period 1961-1962.^^ Bishop's 
model was one of the simplest examined; he employed only 
three independent variables with which to explain educa­
tional spending for the six New England states. These 
three independent variables were: state aid per pupil,
equalized property value per student, and number of pupils 
in average daily attendance (ADA). Bishop's contribution 
was that he used data for towns and cities which were 
weighted by size (number of pupils or expenditures). His 
results indicated that the relationship between state aid 
and expenditures per student was negative or insignificant.
A summary of findings of the Bishop study goes as follows. 
Much variation exists between regression coefficients
^^Bishop, pp. 133-143.
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between states, e.g., + 0.44 in Maine to - 0.98 in Mas­
sachusetts. State aid was the least significant of the 
three variables. Property value was significant except in 
Rhode Island. The size of school membership was signifi­
cant, except in unweighted cases. The substitution effect 
of state aid was found to be greater than the stimulative 
effect. The substitution effect of state aid involves the 
extent to which aid from the state tends to replace local 
dollars, i.e., discourage local effort. The stimulation 
effect of state aid refers to the tendency for aid payments 
to encourage local spending for education.
. -A second study to use state aid and not federal was 
done by Raymond J. Struyk.^^ The Struyk study covered data 
for 140 school districts in New Jersey for 1960. Population 
in the chosen districts was 10,000 or over. Two-stage 
least-sguares regression was done due to the interrelation­
ship between state grants to local districts, total educa­
tional spending per school district, and tax collections of 
the jurisdiction. Struyk*s conclusion was that state aid 
was not significant as a determinant of educational spending 
at the local level.
Gough, in a dissertation, provided a third case in 
which state aid was used in the absence of federal aid to
^^Raymond J. Struyk, "Effects of State Grants-in- 
Aid on Local Provision of Education and Welfare Services 
in New Jersey," Journal of Regional Science 10 (August 
1970): 226.
20
explain local spending per student on e d u c a t i o n . T h e  
data base for the Gough work was 300 school districts in 
Massachusetts for fiscal 1971. State aid was found to have 
a positive effect on local spending for education. From 
each dollar of state aid local districts increased their 
spending by $0.59, according to Gough.
A fourth study by Edward J. Renshaw was a cross-
18sectional analysis using 1950 data for forty-eight states. 
Annual current expense per student in ADA was regressed by 
OLSQ on three independent variables: percentage of revenue
coming from state, per capita income, and percentage of 
state population non-white. A summary of results indicates 
that about 16% of state aid serves to stimulate local spend­
ing, while about 84% was substituted for local spending for 
education. Thus, the substitution effect of state aid was 
found to be greater than the stimulation effect.
Five studies will be cited for using federal and 
not state aid as a determinant of state and local spending 
for education. A study published in the mid-1960's by 
Jack Osman investigated the dual impact of federal aid,
i.e., possible stimulative effect on the aided function and
19the impact of aid on the non-aided function. When a
17
Gough, pp. 27-28.
18
Edward F. Renshaw, "A Note on the Expenditure 
Effect of State Aid to Education," Journal of Political 
Economy 67 (April 1960): 171.
19Jack W. Osman, "The Dual Impact of Federal Aid on 
State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax 
Journal 19 (December 1966): 362-372.
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regression was run using spending on local schools as a 
dependent variable, federal aid was found to have a high 
degree of stimulation. (The regression coefficient for 
federal aid was 2.7.) About $0.33 out of each aided dollar 
goes for items other than the aided function. Other sig­
nificant independent variables according to Osman's study 
were per capita income in the state, federal aid to func­
tions other than education, and the number of students per
1,000 population.
Pogue and Sgontz, using a data base of the forty- 
eight states of the United States, found that federal aid 
was not significant in explaining local and state spending 
for e d u c a t i o n . T o  reach this conclusion, first per 
capita local spending for local education was regressed on 
several independent variables. Then federal aid per capita 
for education was regressed on the same list of explanatory 
variables. Estimates of the model were such that the con­
clusion is made that, "aid payments appear to be determined,
in part, by expenditures and/or the same variables which
21
determine expenditures." The contribution of this project 
was to conclude that models in which federal aid was used 
as an explanatory variable for annual per capita state and 
local spending for education would produce biased estimates
20
Thomas F. Pogue and L. G. Sgontz, "The Effects of 
Grants-In-Aid on State-Local Spending," National Tax Journal 
21 (June 1968): 196-197.--------------- ---------------------
Z^Ibid., p. 199.
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of the impact of federal aid.
A third study by David L. Smith used federal but
not state aid for fifty states of the United States for 
22
fiscal 1965. Federal aid was found not to be statisti­
cally significant in explaining state and local per capita 
spending for education. A negative and significant co­
efficient for the population density variable suggests 
economies of scale. Other significant independent vari­
ables were per capita personal income and public school 
enrollment per 1,000 population.
D. A. L. Auld examined the impact of outside grants 
23on local spending. Auld used data for fifteen cities in 
Ontario as a basis for his study. Both linear and log- 
linear regressions were run, but the linear produced best 
results. From pooled, cross-sectional data it was con­
cluded that conditional grants had a positive impact on 
per capita spending for education. Of interest, average 
taxpayer income was not found to be significant in explain­
ing per capita spending for education at the local level.
Bahl and Saunders indicated that federal aid had 
a significant impact on changes in state per capita spending
22
David L. Smith, "The Response of State and Local 
Governments to Federal Grants," National Tax Journal 21 
(September 1968): 352.
23
D. A. L. Auld, "Provisional Grants and Local 
Government Expenditures," Public Finance Quarterly 4 (July 
1976): 295-306.
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for education, 1957-1960. Five independent variables were 
used in this study, but changes in per capita federal grants 
were most significant. Other independent variables included 
the following: changes in per capita personal income, pop­
ulation density, urban population, and public school enroll­
ment .
Much disagreement exists between the various works 
that were discussed in this chapter. These differing con­
clusions on the impact of state and federal aid to education 
can be justified with reasonable ease. Purposes of the 
studies reviewed varied. Holland's main concern in Oklahoma
was with the impact of a net migration variable on local
25revenue for education. Pidot was concerned with explain­
ing local fiscal patterns in general and not just for edu-
26cational spending. Methods of the researchers often
varied due to this variation in purpose. Inter-state vari-
27
ations in educational spending were significant to some,
28while to others intra-state differences were important. 
Variation in purpose had influence on method and contrib­
uted to the different conclusions reached.
24
Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants 
of Changes in State and Local Government Expenditures," 
National Tax Journal 18 (March 1965) : 51.
^^Holland, pp. 55-66.
Pidot, p. 176.
^^Fisher, pp. 349-355.
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Gough, pp. 27-28.
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With few exceptions, writers used multiple linear 
regression by ordinary least-sguares, but little consis­
tency existed in variables lists used to explain educational 
expenditures. The wide range of explanatory variables used 
to explain state or local spending for education contributed 
negatively to consistency of results.
Some gaps still remain for further work on the im­
pact of intergovernmental grants. More needs to be done 
in measuring impacts of particular components of state and 
federal aid to school districts. Little work has been done 
with the Oklahoma system of financing local education and 
the impact of intergovernmental grants, and more is called 
for. The Holland work was the only citation of meaningful
economic analysis with the system of educational funding in 
29
Oklahoma.
29
Holland, pp. 1-142.
CHAPTER III
INSTITUTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF OKLAHOMA'S COLLECTION AND 
EXPENDITURE PROCESS FOR EDUCATIONAL AID
State aid to education in Oklahoma is apportioned 
by the Senate from dollars collected in the general fund. 
For the fiscal year of 1976 general fund collections 
amounted to $412,038,327.60/ of vrhich $224,748,186.00 was 
returned to school districts in the form of state educa­
tional aid. Thus, about 54.5% of general fund money went 
to educational aid in fiscal 1976. The purposes of this 
chapter are to, first, explain the collection of general 
fund money and, second, to engage a discussion of the state 
aid formula with a numerical example. A better understand­
ing of the Oklahoma system of funding education is useful 
in formulating the model applied to the analysis of that 
system. General fund collections and state aid payments 
change in formulation and absolute dollar amounts from one 
year to the next. This discussion will center around the 
rules and appropriate numbers applying to the fiscal year 
of 1975-76. Fiscal 1976 is used in this illustration, for 
that is the year in which data were collected for the em­
pirical work of Chapter V.
25
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Sources of general fund revenues ranked in impor­
tance for fiscal 1976 appear in Table 1. Nearly half of 
the general fund revenues came from the income tax, almost 
a fourth from the gross production tax, and another fourth 
from vehicle excise, estate, beverage, alcoholic beverage, 
use, cigarette, and franchise taxes. Only two other classes 
of taxes yielded as much as a percent of general fund dol­
lars: sales tax and drivers license revenue. Some eighteen
remaining categories of revenues ranging from tobacco tax 
and license to rural electric coop tax and license contri­
buted a mere 2.709% of monies to the general fund.
State aid to education for school districts in 
Oklahoma centers around a few basic items. Aid is highly 
dependent on average daily attendance (ADA), net assessed 
value, special programs, and local support level.
The Oklahoma Senate appropriates dollars to be used 
for aid to education. These dollars come from general rev­
enue sources and are passed down to school districts in the 
form of foundation and incentive aid in the following man­
ner.
A minimum program is based on the minimum dollars 
necessary to support a student in the public schools. It 
is reasoned that a secondary pupil is more costly to edu­
cate and, thus, the figure for elementary ADA is multiplied 
by a factor of 1.2 to get secondary ADA. For fiscal 1976 
the minimum program simounts for elementary and secondary
27
TABLE 1
REVENUES COLLECTED FOR THE OKLAHOMA GENERAL FUND 
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1976
Percentage of
Amount General Fund
Revenue Source Collected Collection
1. Income Tax $190,317,421.36 46.19
2. Gross Production Tax 98,472,782.09 23.90
3. Vehicle Excise Tax 24,953,082.68 6.06
4. Estate Tax 20,575,963.16 5.00
5. Beverage Tax and
License 13,776,077.55 3.34
6. Alcoholic Beverage
Tax 12,262,538.26 2.98
7. Use Tax 11,001,151.15 2.67
8. Cigarette Tax and
License 10,038,857.29 2.44
9. Franchise Tax 9,463,597.26 2.30
10. Sales Tax 5,400,000.00 1.31
11. Drivers License 4,618,613.03 1.12
12. Tobacco Tax and
License 3,250,936.78 0.788
13. Gift Tax 2,421,020.05 0.588
14. Gasoline Excise Tax
(8/lOOd) 1,340,523.84 0.325
15. Title Fees 977,279.75 0.237
16. Auto and Farm Truck
License 676,353.00 0.164
17. Coin Device License 657,948.27 0.160
18. Oversize Truck
Permits 547,870.00 0.133
19. Freight Car Tax 309,906.73 0.075
20. Registered Agent Fees 296,655.00 0.072
21. Commercial Vehicle
License 279,303.00 0.068
22. Unclaimed Property Fund[ 155,685.20 0.038
23. Special Fuel Decal 73,212.00 0.018
24. Personalized License
Plates 68,147.90 0.017
25. Boat and Motor License 52,190.08 0.013
26. Miscellaneous Receipts 22,690.48 0.006
27. House Trailer License 22,454.00 0.005
28. Fireworks License 3,733.20 0.001
29. Rural Electric Coop
Tax and License 2,334.59 0.001
TOTAL $412,038,327.60 100.019
Source: These figures came from apportionment 
sheets furnished by the Oklahoma Tax Commission for the per­
iod of July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976.
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were $275 and $330 per ADA, respectively.
Minimum program is determined by multiplying ele­
mentary ADA and secondary ADA by appropriate factors. From 
the minimum is deducted chargeable income for the school 
district; this includes the following items:
1. Net assessed value of the school district during 
the next preceding year multiplied by fifteen mills,
2. Seventy-five percent of the amount received by the 
school district from the proceeds of the county 
four mill levy during the second preceding fiscal 
year,
3. Actual collections of the auto license and farm 
truck tax for the second preceding year computed 
on a per capita ADA basis,
4. School land earnings (state apportionment),
5. Gross production tax of the county, shared by school 
districts on an ADA basis,
6. Taxes collected from rural electric installations 
in the county and apportioned to the school dis­
tricts on an ADA basis.
Thus, state foundation aid to education represents 
a minimum amount per student in average daily attendance, 
minus certain chargeable incomes of the school district, 
plus special programs money. Aid for special programs in­
cludes transportation, special education, and vocational 
programs. Each public school district in Oklahoma is 
awarded one-hundred percent of the average approved expen­
diture for pupil transport during the next preceding three 
years. Funds for special education are assigned by multi­
plying the number of programs per district by the appropri­
ate factor for that year. The number of vocational
29
agriculture and other vocational programs are funded at a 
fixed level determined on a yearly basis, dependent on the 
level of legislative appropriations.
An example of how foundation aid was computed for 
Weatherford School District for fiscal year 1975-1976 ap­
pears in Table 2, at the end of this chapter.
In summary, foundation aid consists of minimum pro­
gram monies, minus minimum program chargeable incomes, plus 
special areas monies. In general, state foundation educa­
tional aid will be larger, the more students there are in 
ADA, the lower the level of chargeable revenues, and the 
greater the number of special programs of the particular 
school district.
Incentive aid to education in Oklahoma is currently 
determined by an eight step formula. First, district valu­
ation per ADA (students in average daily attendance) is 
determined by dividing net assessed value of real property, 
personal property, and value of public services (net as­
sessed valuation) in the district by ADA. Second, the dis­
trict wealth ratio is determined by dividing district valu­
ation per ADA by the state average wealth per ADA (8,007 in 
fiscal year 1976). Next, the district wealth ratio is 
multiplied by the local support factor to determine the 
local support ratio. (The local support factor is deter­
mined by the legislature; this figure was 0.553 for fiscal 
year 1976.) The state support ratio is then determined by
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deducting the local support factor from one-hundred percent 
or one. (The legislature determines the maximum and mini­
mum levels for the state support ratio. For fiscal year 
1976 this range was from 0.4150/minimum to 0.8350, maximum. 
If the state support ratio had been calculated for a dis­
trict to be below 0.4150, then 0.4150 would have been used. 
Had the state support ratio been above 0.8350, then 0.8350 
would have been employed.) A fifth step involves computing 
the state average support per mill. This is accomplished 
by dividing the state average wealth per ADA by the local 
support factor. (For fiscal year 1976 this looked as fol­
lows: 8.007 / 0.553 = 14.48 = state support level.) A
sixth step requires that the state support level (deter­
mined in step five) be multiplied by the state support 
ratio (determined in step four) to yield state support per 
mill. The state support per mill is multiplied by mills 
levied above fifteen by the local district to produce the 
matching grant. An eighth and final step produces incentive 
aid by multiplying the matching grant times the ADA of the 
district.
In Table 2, which follows, computations for incen­
tive aid for the Weatherford School District for fiscal 
year 1975-1976 are presented and added to foundation aid 
to derive total state aid.
In summary, there are three basics which control 
the size of the incentive aid to education passed from the
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State to an individual school district. Aside from the 
factors determined by legislative edict, these three items 
are; net assessed valuation of the district, mills levied 
above fifteen, and ADA. Incentive aid will be greater, the 
smaller the net assessed valuation of the district, the 
more mills levied above fifteen, and the more students 
there are in average daily attendance. Total state aid to 
a school district in Oklahoma results from the addition of 
incentive aid and foundation aid.
Certain observations can be made. School districts 
are encouraged to assess property at low rates and tax at 
a thirty-five mill rate to compete for state dollars. The 
incentive for low assessments comes from both foundation 
and incentive aid formulas. Higher net assessed values re­
sult in larger totals for locally-raised revenues charged 
against foundation aid. (See line 4 of the foundation aid 
formula.) In computing a district's incentive aid, higher 
district wealth ratios (line 2) bring about higher local 
support ratios (line 3) and, thus, lower state support ra­
tios (line 4). In other words, the more wealth the dis­
trict shows in re net assessed value the less the state 
will grant in incentive aid. An examination of line 7 of the 
incentive aid formula indicates that a school district 
that votes over fifteen mills of property tax will receive 
incentive aid. School districts are encouraged by state 
aid formulas to adjust local property tax revenues collected
32
not by the mills levied, but by the assessment ratio for 
real property. For fiscal 1976 only eleven Oklahoma school 
districts out of 623 voted less than thirty-five mills on 
property.^
Distortions have been entered into the system as a 
result of this gams which encourages school districts to 
compete against each other for state aid. These distor­
tions will be dealt with later by testing a statistical 
model in an attempt to untangle the puzzle by addressing 
the issue of the true impact of state aid to education on 
local revenue raising. Does incentive aid produce encour­
agement for local districts to finance education, or does 
it produce negative stimulation?
^1975-76 Annual Report, Oklahoma State Department of 
Education by Leslie Fisher, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction (Oklahoma City; Allied Printers and Publishers, 
Inc., 1976), pp. 34-187.
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TABLE 2
WEATHERFORD PUBLIC SCHOOLS STATE AID CALCULATIONS 
FOR SCHOOL YEAR 1975-1976 USING FORMULA
1. Elementary ADA 644 x $275 =
2. Secondary ADA 564 x $330 =
3. Minimum Program Total =
$ 177,100.00
$ 186/120.00 
$ 363,220.00
Subtract Chargeable Income
4. 1974-1975 Net Assessed Val. x 15 Mills
$ 10,419,471.00 X 0.15
5. 1973-1974 Collections of;
75% of County 4 Mill Levy =
6. Auto License and Farm Truck
Tax =
7. School Land Earnings =
8. Gross Production Tax =
9. Rural Electric Coop. Tax =
10. Minimum Program Chargeable
Income Total =
11. Line 11 (Line 3 total Minus
Line 10) Total =
$ 156,292.07
$ 32,440.50
$ 101,399.00
$ 11,280.00 
$ 6,093.00
$ 2,083.00
$ 309,587.57
$ 53,632.43
Add the Following
12. Transportation:
(Average Daily Haul x
Per Capita) (409 x $77.00) =
13. Special Education:
4.0 programs x $5,000 =
14. Vocational Programs:
^ 0  VO. ag. X $3,980 =
$ 31,493.00
$ 20,000.00 
$ 3,980.00
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TABLE 2 (Cont'd.)
15. Line 15: Total Special Areas = $ 60,473.00
FOUNDATION AID (Line 11 plus
Line 15) = $ . 114,105.43
INCENTIVE AID
1. District Valuation divided by District
ADA = District Val. per ADA
•: ($10,419,471 T 1208 = $ 8,625.39
2. District Valuation per ADA divided by
$8,007.00 = District Wealth Ratio
($8,625.39T $8,007.00 = 1.0772
3. District Wealth Ratio x 0.553 =
Local Support Ratio
(1.0772 X 0.553 = 0.5957
4. 1.0000 - Local Support Ratio =
State Support Ratio (Min. 0.4150; Max. 0.8350)
(1.0000 - 0.5957 = 0.4043
5. State Average Support per Mill ($8.007)
divided by 0.553 = Support Level ($14.48)
6. $14.48 X State Support Ratio =
State Support per Mill
($14.48 X 0.4150 = $ 6.0092
7. State Support per Mill x Mills levied
above 15 = Matching Grant
($6.0092 X 20 Mills = $ 120.184
8. Matching Grant x Dist. ADA = INCENTIVE AID
($120.184 X 1208 = $ 145,182.27
(Foundation Aid plus Incentive Aid)
TOTAL STATE AID = :$ 259,287.70
Source: These figures came from tentative state
allocations furnished by the Oklahoma State Department of 
Education for the period of July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976.
CHAPTER IV
TESTING FOR THE INCENTIVE AND EQUALIZATION 
EFFECT OF STATE AID TO EDUCATION:
HYPOTHESES AND MODELS
The impact of intergovernmental transfers has mo­
tivated a body of theoretical and empirical work. A pri­
mary question of much concern to many of these studies is 
the effect on the efficiency of resource allocation. Cer­
tain public goods generate benefits not limited to the 
jurisdiction in which they are purchased. In the case of 
education, benefits are not limited to the local school 
district, but spill over to the state and nation. These 
additional benefits will not be considered by a local 
school district, which will tend to spend too little on 
education. That this is so may be explained by reference 
to Figure 1.
When all the costs of education are borne by the 
local district, the amount purchased will be OA. Without 
state or federal aid, the local district will allocate 
funds so as to equate marginal school district cost (MSDC) 
and marginal school district benefits (MSDB). If the
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FIGURE 1
AN EFFICIENT ALLOCATION 
OF RESOURCES TO EDUCATION
Co
•ri
"S
o
g
n
M
«H
o
a>
ü
k
A4
MSDC
MSDC-
MSDB MSDB+
0 A B
Quantity of Education
Source: Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), p. é?.
36
37
benefits of education that spill over the school district 
boundaries are considered, marginal benefits are represented 
by MSDB+. With MSDB+ and MSDC intersecting at D, the so­
cially optimum quantity of education is OB because at that 
level total benefits equal total costs. This socially op­
timum amount of education will not be purchased by the 
school district on its own initiative. However, if a grant 
is awarded to the local district in the amount of CD, then 
it will purchase OB. Equivalently, the impact of a grant 
CD can be viewed as reducing marginal school district costs 
(MSDC) to the level of MSCD-. In this case the school dis­
trict purchases education of OB, where MSDC- intersects 
MSDB.l
In this example it was assumed that the grant would 
represent a net addition to spending by the school district, 
but that may not be the case. The local unit may use it in
lieu of some of its spending. If so, the amount of educa­
tion purchased would be less than the social optimum. This 
type of unwanted impact may actually be the result of state 
aid rather than the desired result of stimulating total 
spending.
A body of theory exists relating state and federal 
government grants to spending at lower levels of government. 
For an example of the theory of intergovernmental transfers
^Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), pp. 66-71.
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see a work by Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism. Oates 
casts the intergovernmental transfers impacts in a model 
where state and local governments maximize utility subject 
to a budget constraint.
The following analysis assumes that school dis­
tricts are indifferent between the combinations of quanti­
ties of education and quantitites of all other goods that 
would yield the same level of welfare to the school dis­
trict. A budget constraint is placed on the school dis­
trict, which limits its purchases of education and other 
goods. To maximize school district utility, education is 
purchased so that the school district reaches its highest 
indifference curve allowed by its budget constraint.
Government grants can be classified as block grants 
or matching grants. Block grants are awarded to the local 
jurisdiction without requiring reciprocal payments by that 
local district. In Oklahoma, foundation aid and state ded­
icated revenues are block grants. Matching grants are 
given on the basis of the recipient's willingness to match 
the transfers from the higher level government. Incentive 
aid in Oklahoma fits the requirements for a matching grant.
Block grants have the impact of moving the budget 
constraint a parallel amount to the right. Block grants do 
not affect the tax price of education, but they do make 
more available without increased local effort.
^Ibid., pp. 71-78.
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A matching grant changes the slope of the school 
district budget constraint. Matching grants with positive 
matching properties reduce the tax price, while those with 
reverse matching tendencies increase tax price.
By combining the effects of a block and matching 
grant, the net impact of state aid to education in Oklahoma 
on local spending for education can be analyzed. To illus­
trate this impact Figure 2 is used.
A careful examination of the educational aid system 
in Oklahoma led to the tentative hypothesis implicit in 
Figure 2. Without state educational revenues (state foun­
dation aid, state incentive aid, and state dedicated reve­
nue), the local district buys OE^ quantity of education.
The OE^ equilibrium results where indifference curve is 
tangent to budget constraint AB. State grants move the 
budget constraint to CD, which is tangent to Ü2* Budget 
line CD has greater slope than AB, for incentive aid has 
reverse matching tendencies. The new equilibrium brought 
about by the state grants puts the school district on a 
higher indifference curve and increases quantity of educa­
tion purchased to OEg. Thus, total state aid has caused 
purchases of education to increase by the amount E^Eg. 
Budget line CF is added to allow the effects of the block 
and matching grants to be separated. A block grant of AC 
would have given the local district a budget constraint of 
CF. With CF and tangent, the district would have spent
FIGURE 2
SCHOOL DISTRICT EQUILIBRIUM 
WITH BLOCK Aim MATCHING GRANTS
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Source; Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972), pp. 75-78.
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OE^ on education. Thus, the impact of the block grant 
alone would have been to increase local spending from OE^ 
to OE^ (a positive effect). The impact of the matching 
grant with reverse matching tendencies produced a negative 
effect on local spending measured by (OEg - OE^).
In conclusion, Figure 2 is an attempt at summariz­
ing the anticipated effect of state aid on local spending 
for education in Oklahoma. The net effect on local spend­
ing for education was to increase it from OE^ to OEg. The 
matching grant, state incentive aid, had a negative effect 
on local purchases of education, i.e., a decrease from OE^ 
to OEg. The stimulation effect on local spending for edu­
cation was produced by the block grants, state foundation 
aid and state dedicated revenues.
With the theory of intergovernmental grants reviewed 
and with applications to the Oklahoma system of aid to 
local districts completed, several empirical questions re­
main. The purpose of the analysis that follows is to 
measure the impact of state aid to public education on the 
financing of elementary and secondary education in Oklahoma. 
Four hypotheses will be tested. Hypothesis 1: State aid
to education encourages local spending on education in Okla­
homa. Hypothesis 2; Foundation aid encourages local spend­
ing for education; and incentive aid discourages local 
spending for education. Hypothesis 3: Fiscal neutrality
does not exist in Oklahoma with regard to educational spend­
ing per child. Hypothesis 4: Equality of educational
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spending is enhanced by state aid to education.
Tests of the hypotheses employed multiple linear 
regression analysis (by ordinary least-sguares) for three 
models, applied to cross-sectional data on 623 public school 
districts in Oklahoma for the fiscal year of 1976. This 
study predominantly involved an analysis of county units, 
i.e., school districts aggregated into county units and 
analyzed on that basis. School district numbers were used 
when data were available.
The use of a linear demand equation and the use of 
cross-sectional data require justification. The literature 
reviewed in Chapter II showed that linear demand functions 
are often used unless evidence suggests their inappropriate­
ness. This work followed the lead of others and employed 
a demand function for local educational spending which had 
first power variables that related in additive fashion.
Also, an examination of the Oklahoma system of purchasing 
education did not suggest any relationships that would make 
a linear demand function inappropriate.
Two basic ways to structure economic data for a re­
gression model are by means of time series and by cross- 
section. A cross-section regression is fit to observations 
on individual units at a point in time, while a time series 
study is fit to observations over time and usually involves 
an aggregation of economic units. Cross-section regression 
requires the assumption that the structure of the
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relationship is constant across units; time series regres­
sion necessitates the assumption of constant structure 
across dates. The structure is the same for school dis­
tricts for fiscal 1976 in terms of state aid formulas, 
property assessment ratios, general economic conditions, 
distribution of population, and number of school districts. 
Although these factors would be less stable over time, 
this study observes school districts and counties in Okla­
homa in fiscal 1976 so that the assumption of constant 
structural relationships is appropriate. Thus, a cross- 
sectional regression is suggested.
As a rule, cross-section data offer a richer base 
for sampling than time series. For example, time series 
data drawn from yearly observations of total educational 
spending in Oklahoma would be more limited than samples 
drawn from the 623 school districts Oklahoma had in 1975-76.
Time series and cross-section regressions do not 
answer the same questions. Time series regression estimates 
the response of one unit or an aggregation of micro units 
to changes in independent variables. For example, time 
series studies might measure the impact on state spending 
for education over a period of time as certain independent 
variables change. Cross-section regressions relate the 
response of micro units within the aggregation to changes 
in the independent variables. For example, cross-section 
regressions show responses of school districts or county
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units to changes in independent variables. The latter type 
of response fits the purpose of this study, therefore cross- 
section analysis is preferred.
In summary, there are three strong justifications 
for a cross-sectional study. First, structural relations 
affecting educational spending are more stable for fiscal 
1976 than over several years. Second, a cross-sectional 
regression offers the rich data base of the 623 Oklahoma 
school districts. Third, the purpose of the current work 
calls for cross-section regression.^
The model used to test the hypotheses dealing with 
state aid encouraging or discouraging local spending for 
education is as discussed below.
Ï1 = b„ + + b^ X; + bjXj + . . . + b^ oXio + U
where
bg = constant term
b^ = regression coefficient for X^, i = 1, 2, ...,10
u = residual term
= Personal Income/Population
X = Average Daily Attendance/Number of School 
Districts per County
X^ = Average Daily Attendance/1,000 Population
_ (1975-76 Enrollment - 1970-71 Enrollment)
4 1970-71 Enrollment
3
Edward M. Gramlich, "Effects of Federal Grants on 
State-Local Expenditures: A Review of the Econometric
Literature," National Tax Association, Proceedings of the 
Sixty-second Annual Conference on Taxation, 1969, pp. 578- 
581.
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Xj = Federal Aid to Education/ADA 
Xg = State Foundation Aid/ADA 
X^ = State Incentive Aid/ADA 
Xg = State Dedicated Revenue/ADA 
Xg = Total State Aid to Education/ADA 
X^g = Market Value of Property/Population 
= Local Educational Revenue/ADA 
= Local Assessment Ratio.
The above model was used in two basically different
ways. By leaving out X-, X , Xç, the model was fitted to
0 / 0
test the hypothesis that state aid discourages local spend­
ing for education. By examining the coefficient for Xg the 
question was dealt with as to whether or not state aid 
stimulates local spending. Alternatively, the model was 
used without Xg to see where the encouragement of local 
spending originates in regard to aid from the state. An 
examination of the regression coefficients for Xg, X^, Xg 
allowed an explanation of what part of the state aid pack­
age stimulates local educational spending and which portion 
did not.
A significant amount of concern in testing this 
model was placed on the possibility of multicollinearity.
In several of the articles examined, problems have been 
created due to one or more of the independent variables 
being correlated with each other. For an example of this 
problem in a model similar to the one stated here, see a
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paper by Bahl and Saunders.  ^ For this study multicollinear­
ity was detected by the use of the Farrar-Glauber Test aided 
by factor analysis.^
Another problem of concern was heteroscedasticity. 
One of the negative features of cross-sectional data is that 
it often produced heteroscedastic error terms. When reasons 
existed to expect heteroscedasticity (failure of regression 
coefficients to be significant) square residuals were plot­
ted against the suspect independent variable to test for 
heteroscedasticity.^
Some discussion needs to be given to the independent 
variables and their expected signs.
X^: Personal Income/Population. The personal in­
come per capita variable was intended as a measure of the 
capacity to support education and was expected to be posi­
tively correlated with local spending for education per 
capita. Thus, the expected sign of b^ was positive, where 
b^ = 3Y/3X .
X^: ADA/Number of School Districts per County.
This variable represents the mean size school district for
4
Roy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Factors Asso­
ciated with Variations in State and Local Government 
Spending," Journal of Finance 21 (September 1966): 525-526.
5
Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multi­
colinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited,"
Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (February 1967): 102- 
ÏÔ51
^Damodar Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 201-202.
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each county in terms of students in average daily attendance 
(ADA). It was often used in the regression equation as one 
variable and, at times, as three with break-downs made in 
terms of three sizes of school districts. The Oklahoma data 
were such that the following designations were appropriate 
in terms of small, moderate, and large districts. Small 
districts included those from 0-600 ADA. Moderate spanned 
601-1200 ADA. Large districts were declared when ADA was 
in excess of 1200 per district per county. By using a sin­
gle variable in the regression equation for mean ADA per 
district per county (X^ ) the impact on local spending could 
be determined. Where smaller school districts are present, 
more busing is required which requires more spending. An 
examination of the sign of b^ allowed a measure of this size 
effect. Negative values for b^ suggest that larger dis­
tricts collect less local revenue for education and posi­
tive values imply more collected by larger districts. By 
employing the mean ADA variable in three parts (X^^/ ^2B' 
X^^) internal economies of scale could be examined. Nega­
tive regression coefficients for the school district size 
variables suggested internal economies of scale. That is, 
to be a larger school district was to collect less revenue 
for education locally (spend less). When regression co­
efficients for (Xg^, X^g, X^ç) resulted in positive values.
7
Werner Z. Hirsch, "Determinants of Public Educa­
tion Expenditures," National Tax Journal 13 (March 1960): 
33.
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disadvantages to size were suggested.
X^: ADA/1/OOP Population. This variable, relating
public school enrollments to total population, was included 
because it was thought to help explain demand for education. 
The greater the number of public school students per 1,000 
population the greater will be the desire to spend for edu­
cation locally. Thus, b^ should be positive.
X^: Percentage Change in Enrollments. Percentage 
change in enrollments during the last five years is used to 
classify high growth areas versus low or average growth 
counties. If it is true that high growth areas spend more 
dollars per student than low growth areas, then the sign of 
b^ will be positive.
Xg: Federal Aid to Education/ADA. Whether federal
aid stimulates local spending for education or represents 
substitution for local spending depends on marginal propen­
sity of the county to spend on the aided good, education.
Matching aid is more apt to stimulate local effort than is
8non-matching aid. The analysis is made more difficult by 
the fact that both matching and non-matching aid is involved 
and no attempt is made to separate their effects. In fiscal 
1976, 4.7% of the federal funds which came to Oklahoma for 
education were matched, with 95.3% not matched. To the ex­
tent federal aid is substituted for local educational
8
James A. Wilde, "The Expenditure Effects of Grants- 
In-Aid Programs," National Tax Journal 21 (September 1968): 
343.
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spending the sign of will be negative. The stimulative 
effect of federal funds for local spending will be evidenced 
by a positive tendency for b^. It is being argued that the 
substitution effects of federal aid to education will over­
weigh the stimulative effects in re local educational effort. 
Thus, the sign of b^ was predicted to be negative.
X^: State Foundation Aid/ADA. An examination of
D “
the foundation component of state aid suggests that it is 
largely paid to districts in an inverse fashion to their 
ability to pay. Districts are paid flat amounts per student 
in average daily attendance at the elementary and secondary 
level, twenty percent more per secondary student than per 
elementary one. Several designations of locally collected 
revenues are, next, deducted from the foundation grants.
Then, flat grants for special programs, such as special 
education and vocational agriculture are accumulated to 
complete the foundation aid computation. These flat grants, 
such as the $6,000 one for each special education program 
per district, can be expected to stimulate local spending. 
This should be stimulative, for $6,000 would not even pay
9
an average teacher salary; thus, the existence of a special 
education program suggests additional revenues which will 
likely come from local sources. State foundation aid has
9
■ 1975-76 Annual Report, Oklahoma State Department 
of Education by Leslie Fisher, State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction (Oklahoma City: Allied Printers and
Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 28.
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components which should both stimulate and be substituted
for local spending. The sign of b depends on which of the
5
two forces of stimulation or substitution is greater.
The causation, instead of being straightfonward 
between foundation aid and local spending may be of the 
third factor type. Low levels of local wealth may contrib­
ute to both low local spending on education and a high 
level of foundation aid. This third factor effect has 
prompted the inclusion of , market value of property 
per capita.
X^: State Incentive Aid/ADA. State incentive aid
depends on two main variables: local ability to pay, mea­
sured by the net assessed value of property and the willing­
ness to support education locally, as mirrored by the 
property tax millage voted over fifteen. Districts are 
penalized in incentive aid receipts who have high property 
valuations per student. Thus, there is a disincentive to 
assess property at relatively high rates of value. However, 
districts are encouraged to vote high rates of property 
tax on themselves. In fact, if the school district does 
not vote millage in excess of fifteen no incentive aid will 
be forthcoming. Since both an incentive to local spending 
as well as disincentive exist, an a priori projection as to 
the sign of b^ was complicated. A careful examination of 
Oklahoma's incentive aid formulation for fiscal 1976 reveals 
what might be called reverse matching tendencies, i.e., more
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state aid was the reward for less local effort. Thus, the 
sign of was likely to be negative, indicating disincen­
tive to local spending for education.
Xg: State Dedicated Revenue/ADA. State dedicated
revenue is collected by the state, but given back to the 
districts in which it was collected, independent of the 
state incentive and foundation formulas. These dedicated 
revenues depend directly on the wealth of the district.
Since districts may view these revenues similarly to local 
spending for education, it was expected that these would 
not stimulate local spending but be a substitute for it; 
thus, a negative sign for bg.
Xg: Total State Aid/ADA. This variable for total
state aid includes foundation, incentive, and miscellaneous 
aid. While foundation and incentive aids are inclusive of 
the majority of state aid to education, other categories 
include the following: recent teacher salary increases,
spending for special education, elementary counseling, and 
support personnel. An examination of bg allowed an answer 
to the question of whether or not state aid stimulates 
local spending for education. Since there are forces of 
encouragement and discouragement to local spending inherent 
in the aid formulations, the expected sign of bg was not 
presupposed. If the sign associated with the bg coefficient 
was positive, then state aid was to be viewed as an encourag­
ing factor for local effort. If the sign of bg was negative, 
then local spending was reduced as a result of state aid.
52
X^Q* Market Value of Property/Population. Property 
value is a measure of ability to finance education as is 
income per capita. Demand relationships commonly involve 
wealth as an independent v a r i a b l e . I f  wealth is defined 
to include all items of realizable market value, then the 
forms it can take on are many and varied. Items included 
in wealth range from durable personal possessions, such as 
clothing, house, and automobile to intangible items, such 
as equities in life insurance, annuities or retirement 
f u n d s . H a v i n g  more or less of these items should influ­
ence one's desire to purchase education. Due to the diffi­
culty associated with measuring wealth, real property will 
serve as its proxy. It was expected that wealth, for which 
real property is being used as a proxy, should be positively 
related to local spending for education. Thus the sign of 
b^Q should have been positive, suggesting that a higher 
value of wealth would imply a larger expenditure for educa­
tion and vice versa. In order to separate the effects of 
personal and real versus public service property wealth the 
variable was split-up. An variable designated
market value of real and personal property, while X^^^ mea­
sured market value of public service property. If taxpayers
^^James E. Hibdon, Price and Welfare Theory (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1969), p. 14.
^^Daphne Greenwood, "An Estimation of the Distribu­
tion of Wealth in the U.S., 1972." (Ph.D. disseration 
(proposed), University of Oklahoma, 1978), p. 6.
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were more intent on high assessment ratios and local revenue
raised when more of the tax would not be paid directly by
them, then the coefficients of and should have
reflected this.
Y^: Local Educational Revenue/ADA. This dependent
variable measures the revenue which is locally raised per
student in average daily attendance. Typically, demand
functions measure changes in quantity purchased in response
12to changes in certain relevant variables. Education pre­
sents a tough problem in defining quantity. Common to the 
literature of demand for public education is the use of 
spending or revenue as a measure of quantity purchased.
This study employed revenue raised as a proxy for quantity 
of education. It is the local revenue variable that is of 
concern in measuring the impact of state aid to education. 
However, the local district (county) has little control 
over the amount of revenue collected except via the assess­
ment ratio. Thus, a second dependent variable was used in 
the model as an alternative to Y^.
y|: Local Assessment Ratio. This variable indi­
cates the percentage of market value at which the county 
assesses its property. A 10% assessment ratio suggests 
that property is assessed at 10% of its fair market value. 
Higher assessment ratios per county would indicate greater
^^Hibdon, pp. 14-16.
^^Hirsch, p. 33.
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local effort and vice versa. Through election of the county 
assessor, persons living in the county have some control 
over rates at which property will be valued in terms of its 
market value.
The model for testing for fiscal neutrality is dis­
cussed below. The Serrano v. Priest case established a 
mandate that educational spending was not to be tied to the 
wealth of the district. Educational revenues per student 
was used as a proxy for quality of education. Fair market 
value of property was used for district wealth per student. 
Thus, fiscal neutrality makes it unlawful to make the quality
of education of a child dependent on their place of resi-
14dence within a given state.
Define the following variables:
= Total Educational Revenue/ADA 
= Market Value of Property/ADA
Model:
Hypothesis Test:
«0= h o  ' °
h =  h o  ^ °
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241, 
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), cited by Martin S. Feldstein, 
"Wealth Neutrality and Local Choice in Public Education," 
American Economic Review 65 (March 1975): 77.
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If the data indicate that the null hypothesis must 
be rejected, then it could be concluded that fiscal neutral­
ity does not exist in Oklahoma.
A model for testing the impact of state aid on the 
equalization of educational spending, the fourth hypothesis, 
was supplied as follows:
where
= Xg = Total State Aid to Education/ADA
X^Q = Market Value of Property/ADA.
Hypothesis Test:
=0= ^ 1  - ° 
”a= hi ■= °
Since = b^^, b^^ can be examined in terms
of sign to accept or reject the hypothesis that equality of 
educational spending is reduced by state aid to education. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected it can be concluded that 
equality of educational spending is not reduced as a result 
of state aid to education.
CHAPTER V
TESTING FOR THE INCENTIVE AND EQUALIZATION 
EFFECT OF STATE AID TO EDUCATION:
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the re­
sults of empirical testing of the models outlined in the 
preceding chapter.
Test of Hypothesis One
The first hypothesis is: state aid to education
encourages local spending for education. The complete model 
used to test this first hypothesis is provided below.
(5-1) + b^Xj + bjXj 4. 4- bjXj
where
bg = constant term
bj^  = regression coefficient for i = 1, 2, ...,10
u = residual term
= Personal Income/Population
X^ = Average Daily Attendance/Number of School 
Districts per County
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= Average Daily Attendance/1,000 Population
y _ (1975-76 Enrollment - 1970-71 Enrollment) 
4 " 1970-71 Enrollment
Xg = Federal Aid to Education/ADA
Xg = Total State Aid to Education/ADA
X^Q = Market Value of Property/Population
= Local Educational Revenue/ADA
y| = Local Assessment Ratio.
The regression results of the above model are pre- 
1
sented below.
(5-2) Y, = -113.356 + 0.057 X, + 0.007 X„ - 1.273 X
(3.43)  ^ (0.49)  ^ (-2.41)-^
- 4.056 X. - 0.757 X. + 0.543 X- + 0.013 X,- 
(-2.21)^ (-2.64)^ (2.83)  ^ (7.63)
= 0.92005
The t-scores are in parentheses, and to be signifi­
cant their absolute values must be greater than or equal to
^The income and population figures came from prelim­
inary data for the Statistical Abstract of Oklahoma 1978 by 
Neil J. Dikeman, Jr., and Marjorie E. Earley (Norman: Uni­
versity of Oklahoma, 1978), pp. 15, 16, 277, 278. The local
assessment ratios were supplied in a telephone interview 
with J. L. Merrill, Oklahoma Tax Commission, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma 13 March 1978 and Oklahoma Tax Commission, Average 
Assessment Rates for Locally Assessed Property, By County 
Based on Mean Assessment Rates Estimated by Professional 
Appraisers: Oklahoma 1976. All other data for this study
came from 1971-72 Annual Report, Oklahoma State Department 
of Education by Leslie Fisher, State Superintendent of 
Public Instruction (Oklahoma City: Oklahoma State Board of
Affairs' Print Shop, 1972), p. 17, and 1975-76 Annual Report, 
Oklahoma State Department of Education by Leslie Fisher, 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction (Oklahoma City: 
Allied Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1976), pp. 21-187.
58
1.97. The sample had seventy-seven observations and was
tested at the 0.05 significance level. Notice that only
the coefficient of the variable was not significant.
Heteroscedasticity was questioned in equation (5-2), due to
the insignificance of b^. Cross-sectional data are often
plagued with heteroscedasticity. A test for the detection
2
of heteroscedasticity is suggested by Gujarati. The test 
uses the residuals as proxies for the error terms. Squared 
residuals are graphed with corresponding values of the sus­
pect independent variables (ones which produce insignifi­
cant regression coefficients). In equation (5-2), the 
variable was not significant and was tested for heterosce­
dasticity by the method discussed above. No pattern was 
present in the plotting of squared residuals versus the X^ 
values. A density variable, similar to X^, was not signi­
ficant when used by Holland in a comparable model for edu­
cation in Oklahoma. Transportation in Oklahoma is funded 
largely through the state, as part of foundation aid (spe­
cial programs). This may keep the average school district 
size from being significant.^
Elasticities of local educational revenue per ADA
2
Damodar Gujarati, Basic Econometrics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 201-202.
^David William Holland, "The Geographic and Income 
Class Distribution of the Benefits and Costs of Public 
Education— Implications for Common School Finance." (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 1972), p. 63.
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with respect to the significant independent variables are 
helpful in analyzing equation (5-2). The formula used to 
compute the income elasticity coefficient was; (3Y/9X^)
(X^/Y), where X^ is mean income and Y is mean local educa­
tional revenue.^  Elasticities for the other independent 
variables were computed in similar fashion. The following 
elasticities resulted for equation (5-2): income, 0.667;
ADA/1,000 population, - 0.649; past five year enrollment 
growth, 0.0053; federal aid to education/ADA, - 0.190; 
total state educational revenue/ADA, 0.818; and wealth,
0.61. Notice that income elasticity is positive, thus 
education is a superior good in Oklahoma, i.e., as incomes 
rise the percentage change in educational revenues is greater 
than the percentage change in income. A similar statement 
to the one regarding income can be made for property wealth, 
for it also has positive elasticity. The elasticity coef­
ficient for state educational revenue suggests that a one 
percent increase in state revenue results in a 0.8% increase 
in local educational revenue.
Some of the signs of the regression coefficients 
were as predicted and some were not. The sign for the per 
capita income variable (X^) was positive as expected. The 
X^ variable (ADA/1,000 Population) had a negative sign rather 
than the predicted positive.
4
Werner Z. Hirsch, "Determinants of Public Educa­
tion Expenditures," National Tax Journal 13 (March 1960): 
37.
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The negative sign yielded by (the regression co­
efficient for the enrollment growth variable) suggests that 
time lag problems keep high growth areas behind on their 
spending and low growth areas ahead in terms of per capita 
spending. When enrollments in an area increase, it is rea­
sonable for a time lag to exist between the increased spend­
ing needs and the revised spending. Thus, the new funds 
may be months or years in catching up with the new growth 
of increased enrollments. When enrollments are lost, a 
time period may separate the recognition of lessened need 
and decreased spending. Thus, time lags could explain the 
negative sign of b^.
Federal aid to education/ADA (X^ ) produced a nega­
tive regression coefficient as predicted. This result would 
support the argument that federal aid has more of a substi­
tution effect on local spending than a stimulation. In­
creased federal aid corresponds to decreased levels of local 
educational revenue, thus federal funds substitute for local 
effort.
Per capita property wealth was represented by 
(Market Value of Property/Population) which produced a posi­
tive coefficient of regression as projected. This result 
allows one to conclude that greater levels of real property 
wealth implies higher levels of local spending for education.
The total state aid variable (X^ ) had a positive 
sign, allowing an acceptance of the first hypothesis: State
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aid to education encourages local spending on education in 
Oklahoma. For the variable, data for allocated state 
monies were used alternative to those actually paid, and 
produced virtually the same results. Signs and signifi­
cance of all regression coefficients were the same; actual 
values of coefficients varied little. See equation (5-2*) 
for the regression results produced by allocated state 
revenues (X^).
(5-2') Yn = - 48.426 + 0.058 X^  + 0.008 X - 1.323 X_
(3.36) ^ (0.50) (-2.46)-^
-- 3.720 X - 0.777 X + 0.550 X' + 0.013 X 
(-2.03)^ (-2.68)^ (2.51)  ^ (7.85)
I? = 0.91815,
where = Total State Aid to Education/ADA (Allocated).
Also, the model was run with the local assessment 
ratio (yp used as the dependent variable. The results are
shown in the equation below.
(5-3) Y' = 1.158 + 0.001 X + 0.001 X + 0.003 X
(4.98) ^ (4.92)  ^ (0.34)
- 0.043 X. - 0.006 X- + 0.004 X - 0.0001 X 
(-1.56)^ (-1.47)^ (1.40)  ^ (-4.28)
J? = 0.81338
Variables having significant regression coefficients 
for equation (5-3) are three : per capita income (X^), aver­
age size of school district per county (X^), and per capita 
property value (X^^). The state aid variable was not helpful
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in explaining the local assessment ratio.
The model was, also, fit with the (ADA/Number of 
School Districts per County) variable separated into three 
components, X^^, X^^. Data used for these were the
mean ADA per school district per county. If this mean was 
above 1,200 it was used in the X^^ variable, with zeroes in 
the X^g and X^^ variables. If the mean ADA per school dis­
trict per county was between 601 and 1,200, it was used in 
the Xgg variable with zeroes in X^^ and X^^. When the mean 
ADA was below 601, it was used in the X^^ variable with 
zeroes in the X^^ and X^^ variables. Essentially, what was 
done here was to use a weighted dummy variable for average 
school district size per county.
As regressed with the mean ADA broken dovm as dis­
cussed above the following results were produced.
(5-4) Y, = - 127.76 + 0.057 X, + 0.010 X + 0.021 X
(3.34) (0.56) (0.30)
+ 0.025 X, - 1.279 X - 4.067 X. - 0.745 X_ 
(0.21) (-2.36)-^ (-2.05)^ (-2.5) ^
+ 0.551 Xq + 0.0128 X^
(2.78) ^ (7.19) ,
BT = 0.92019
These results were similar to the prior results 
achieved when X^ (ADA/Number of School Districts per County) 
was run as one variable. None of the coefficients for the 
separated X^ variable was significant at the 0.05 level; 
thus, no explanatory value was added to the model as a re­
sult of dividing the X^ variable into three components.
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Regressing the above model with local assessment 
ratio as the dependent variable produced diverse results.
(5-5) y' = 2.667 + 0.001 + 0.001 X + 0.001 X
 ^ (5.09) (3.98) (1.06)
+ 0.001 X. - 0.001 X - 0.052 X - 0.006 X
(0.32) (-1.06)-^ (-1.77)^ (-1.41)^
+ 0.006 X - 0.0002 X
(1.92)  ^ (-4.33) .
R = 0.82014
Few variables were significant in this case. Sig­
nificant were X^, X^^, and X^^, i.e./ income, large school 
districts, and wealth. More income and larger school dis­
tricts resulted in higher assessment ratios, i.e., greater 
effort in financing education. Greater amounts of property 
tax wealth resulted in less desire to tax property at high 
rates and thus to fund education locally.
When the model was fit with the market value of 
property variable (X^^) broken down into X^^^ (Market Value 
of Personal and Real Property/Population) and X^^^ (Market 
Value of Public Service Property/Population), the results 
were as follows.
(5-6) Y, = 226.72 + 0.056 X, + 0.011 X - 1.924 X
(6.18) (1.38) (-6.62)
+ 0.126 X. + 0.089 X + 0.017 X + 0.008 X^_ 
(0.12) (0.53) (0.15) (8.51)
R = 0.97745
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In this configuration the model only yielded three 
significant coefficients: per capita income (X^), ADA/
1,000 population (X^), and per capita wealth (X^^^ and X^Qg)• 
The conclusion here is that the most important determinants 
of what a school district spends for education are its per 
capita income and wealth. State aid as well as the items 
other than ADA per 1,000 population were not helpful in ex­
plaining local spending for education. The signs of both 
the wealth variables were positive indicating that more 
wealth means more dollars for education locally raised, re­
gardless of the origin of the wealth, i.e., personal or 
public service.
When the "prior model was fit using the county average 
assessment ratio as the dependent variable results were as 
listed. Note that X^^^ represents personal and real prop­
erty value per capita and X^^^ represents public service 
property value per capita. Both are in market value terms.
(5-7) Y' = 4.015 + 0.001 X^  + 0.001 X, - 0.003 X - 0-008 X.
(5.55) ^ (5.69)  ^ (-0.38)^ (-0.31)^
+ 0.001 X - 0.0004 X - 0.0001 X,
(0.18)  ^ (-0.13)  ^ (6.07)
+ 0.0003 X
= 0.85807
A regression of the local assessment ratio on the 
same variables as above produced similar results. Signifi­
cant variables in explaining local assessment rates were 
per capita income, per capita wealth, and mean school
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district size per county. The sign of (the regression 
coefficient for the per capita income variable) was ex­
pected to be positive, and was. Greater levels of per 
capita income meant higher assessment ratios. The division 
of the wealth variable made a contribution; the sign of 
^lOA Value of Personal and Real Property/Population)
was negative, while the sign of (Market Value of Public
Service Property/Population) was positive. An interpreta­
tion can be made that personal property wealth and assess­
ment ratios were negatively related, while public service 
property wealth and assessment ratios were positively re­
lated. Thus, local districts were more interested in fund­
ing education out of public service wealth than out of 
personal wealth.
When the model was regressed breaking down the vari­
ables (ADA/Number of School Districts per County) and 
the X^Q (Market Value of Property/Population), few regres­
sion coefficients were significant, whether using (Local 
Educational Revenue/ADA) or Y| (Local Assessment Ratio) as 
the dependent variable. Those results are presented in the 
two following equations.
(5-8) Y^ = 209.875 + 0.057 X, + 0.015 X + 0.028 X
(6.12) (1.50) (0.72)
+ 0.060 - 1.959 X + 0.357 X + 0.101 X
(0.89) (-6.59) (0.32) (0.58)
+ 0.015 Xq + 0.008 X.._ + 0.061 X,
(0.13) (8.09) (15.66)^°^
R^ = 0.97766
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(5-9) Y' = 4.001 + 0.001 X, + 0.001 X + 0.001 X
^ (5.28) (4.63) (1.20)
+ 0.001 X,^ - 0.002 X - 0.012 X + O.OOOl X
(0.46) (-0.31)-^ (-0.43) - (0.19)
- 0.0002 X. - 0.0001 X..^ + 0.0003 X^
(-0.07)  ^ (-5.65) ° (3.08)
= 0.85850
In both instances of the above two models per capita
income (X^ ) and wealth (X^^^ and X^Qg) variables were sig­
nificant. When Y^ (Local Educational Revenue /ADA) was 
used/ both the X^^^ and X^^g variables were positively re­
lated to Y^. VJhen Y| (Local Assessment Ratio) was involved, 
XioA had negative impact and X^^g had positive impact. One 
additional variable was significant in each case. With Y^ 
(local revenue per ADA), the X^ (ADA per 1,000 population) 
variable was significant. In explaining Y^ (local assess­
ment ratio) the large school district variable (X^^) was 
helpful. In neither case was the regression coefficient 
for state aid to education (bg) significant.
Using the Farrar-Glauber test for severe multicol­
linearity, it was determined that per capita income (X^ ) and 
wealth (X^g) were highly interrelated.^ Thus, the model v^ as 
fit using the income or wealth variable, but not both. See 
Appendix 2 for a reporting of the results of the Farrar-
^Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicol­
linearity in Regression Analysis; The Problem Revisited," 
Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (February 1967) : 
102-105.
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Glauber test. The Farrar-Glauber test for multicollinearity 
was used rather than the Durbin-Watson test, due to the data. 
Farrar-Glauber is applicable to cross-section regressions, 
while Durbin-Watson statistics only apply to time series 
studies.^ Also, a factor analysis was done to further sub­
stantiate the severe multicollinearity results; see Appendix 
3. After regressing the model with per capita income or 
wealth deleted, the most promising result is reported below.
(5-10) Y, = - 465.81 + 0.141 X, - 0.038 X- - 1.581 X,
(7.46) (-1.97) (-2.15)
- 7.015 X. - 1.119 X. + 1.403 X'
(-2.87) (-2.86) (5.38)
- 0.8383,
where = Total State Aid to Education/ADA (Allocated).
These results are similar to the model initially 
discussed with respect to the testing of the first hypothe­
sis; see equation (5-2). All the regression coefficients 
were significant. The signs were the same as for equation 
(5-2), except (the mean school district size variable) 
had a negative sign and was significant in equation (5-10). 
Elasticity of local spending with respect for state educa­
tional aid was greater in this later case: 1.656 for equa­
tion (5-2) compared to 0.818 in equation (5-10).
The analysis with respect to the testing of the 
first hypothesis was lengthy enough to require a summary.
^Ibid., p. 92.
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The first hypothesis was accepted: State aid to education
encourages local spending for education in Oklahoma. Per 
capita income showed a positive impact in terms of local 
spending for education. The mean school district size 
variable (Xg) was ambiguous and contributed little to the 
explanatory value of the model. The ADA/1,000 population 
variable, X^, consistently showed a negative influence on 
local spending for education, which was in opposition to 
what was anticipated. The population growth over the last 
five years was dealt with in X^; its influence on local 
spending was negative. Time lags best explain why this 
influence would be negative. For a time after enrollments 
go down spending per student remains high, and vice versa. 
Per capita wealth and local revenue for education were posi­
tively related; this was as expected. Localities are more 
interested in raising assessment ratios due to public ser­
vice wealth increases than personal wealth increases. For 
justification of this last statement see equation (5-9).
Test of Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two was divided into two parts. Founda­
tion aid encourages local spending for education; and incen­
tive aid discourages local spending for education.
The model used in testing this two-part hypothesis 
is specified as follows.
(5-11) Ï1 = b, + + b^X, + bjXj + b,X, f bgXg + bgXg
+  b y X ^  +  b g X g  +  b ^ g X ^ Q  + u
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where
bjj = constant term
= regression coefficient for X^, i = 1, 2, ...,10
u = residual term
= Personal Income/Population
X- = Average Daily Attendance/Number of School 
Districts per County
= Average Daily Attendance/1,000 Population
_ (1975-76 Enrollment - 1970-71 Enrollment)
4 1970-71 Enrollment
Xg = Federal Aid to Education/ADA
Xg = State Foundation Aid/ADA
X^ = State Incentive Aid/ADA
Xg = State Dedicated Revenue/ADA
= Market Value of Property/Population
= Local Educational Revenue/ADA
y| = Local Assessment Ratio.
In estimating this model problems of severe multi­
collinearity were experienced which plagued the entire 
analysis of measuring the stimulative and substitutive in­
fluences of state aid. By employing the Farrar-Glauber test
7for severe multicollinearity the following results developed. 
Variables causing problems in the analysis were X^, Xg, X^, 
Xg, and X^Q. The per capita income and wealth variables
(^ 1 and X^q) were highly interrelated. Also, the Xg, X^, 
^Ibid., pp. 102-105.
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and Xg variables were severely multicollinear. (See Appendix 
4).
As a further test of multicollinearity a factor anal­
ysis was performed. (See Appendix 3.) Conclusions derived
from the factor analysis were that either X- (State Founda-
6
tion Aid/ADA) or X^ (State Incentive Aid/ADA) should be used, 
but not both. Also, Xg (State Dedicated Revenue/ADA) or X^^ 
(Market Value of Property/Population) or X^g^ (Market Value 
of Real and Personal Property/Population) and X^gg (Market 
Value of Public Service Property/Population) should be used 
alternatively in equation (5-11). Representative results 
of the model fit with these prescribed deletions follow.
To test the part of the second hypothesis dealing 
with foundation aid, Xg was used in the model without X^;
XlOA ^lOB used instead of Xg or X^g.
(5-12) Y, = 460.60 + 0.023 X. - 1.356 X_ - 0.784 X.
(2.55) (-3.72) (-0.69)
+ 0.002 Xc - 0.772 X, + 0.0098 X...
(0.01) (-3.60)*' (9.81)
+ 0.060 Xt «Q 2
(15.20) R = 0.96881
With assessment ratio as the dependent variable the 
results were similar.
(5-13) YJ = 8.856 - 0.001 X^ + 0.014 X - 0.023 X
(6.64) (1.74) (-0.89)
+ 0.002 Xg - 0.024 Xg - 0.00012 X,g.
(0.34) (-5.02) (-5.42)
+ 0.003 X.. R^ = 0.83906
(3.06)
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A discussion of the results of equations (5-12) and 
(5-13) is needed. Neither of the equations produced signif­
icant coefficients for (Enrollment Growth over prior five 
years) and (Federal Aid to Education/ADA). In equation
(5-13) the X^ (ADA/1,000 Population) variable was not sig­
nificant. The X^ (ADA/Number of School Districts per 
County) variable produced significant and positive coeffi­
cients. Larger school districts spend more for education 
and have higher assessment ratios. The personal and public 
service property variables, X^^^ and X^gg, respectively, 
were significant in both cases. Property wealth affects 
local educational revenues positively. High personal pro­
perty values impact negatively on assessment ratios, but 
public service property values impact positively on assess­
ment rates. Citizens are more interested in higher property 
assessment rates when the higher taxes are paid out of pub­
lic service wealth.
The foundation aid variable, Xg, produced signifi­
cant and negative coefficients in equations (5-12) and 
(5-13). Foundation aid acts as a substitute for local 
spending, i.e., discourages local spending for education.
Alternatively, the model was fit with X^ (State 
Incentive Aid/ADA), X^^^ (Market Value of Real and Personal 
Property/Population), and X^gg (Market Value of Public 
Service Property/Population) to test the hypothesis dealing 
with the impact on local spending for education by state
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incentive aid. These results can be observed in equations
(5-14) and (5-15).
(5-14) = 549.890 + 0.027 X_ - 1.244 X - 0.946 X
^ (2.96)  ^ (-3.02)^ (-0.80)*
- 0.111 X - 1.208 X- + 0.009 X^.
(-0.55)^ (-2.79) ' (8.06) ^
(5-15) Y' = 11.751 + 0.001 X + 0.018 X - 0.027 X.
(6.99)  ^ (1.98) (-0.99)
- 0.002 X - 0.039 X_ - 0.0001 X,
(-0.36)^ (-3.98) ‘ (-5.23)
The similarity of results between equations (5-12),
(5-13), (5-14), and (5-15) was to be expected, for the cor­
relation coefficient between Xg (State Foundation Aid/ADA) 
and Xy (State Incentive Aid/ADA) is 0.91352. The founda­
tion and incentive aid variables contain similar information, 
thus the regression results were similar with incentive and 
foundation aid used alternatively.
In equation (5-14) and (5-15) the sign of the re­
gression coefficient for the incentive aid variable (X^ ) was 
significant and negative. Incentive aid discourages local 
funding for education via the property tax. Lower assess­
ments are encouraged by the incentive aid formula, which 
reduces local revenue raised for education. Again, the re­
gression coefficient of the personal property variable
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(Xio^) had a negative sign when the assessment ratio was 
regressed, while the coefficient of the public service pro­
perty variable had a positive sign. Thus, taxpayers
are more intent on raising assessment ratios when it is done 
to tax public service property and not personal property.
The variable, relating mean ADA per school district per 
county, was significant and positive. Large school dis­
tricts pay more locally for education and have higher assess­
ment rates. Inconsistent results were yielded by the coef­
ficient for the X^ variable, which measured ADA per 1,000 
population.
As a conclusion to the discussion of testing the 
second hypothesis the following findings can be summarized. 
Both foundation and incentive aid were found to have a 
negative impact on local funding of education. The first 
part of the second hypothesis is rejected: foundation aid
does not encourage local spending for education. The sec­
ond part of the hypothesis is accepted: incentive aid
discourages local funding for education.
Recall that total state educational revenue was 
found to stimulate local spending for education. Both foun­
dation and incentive aid were found to discourage local 
spending for education. Consistency with the above findings 
required the effect of state dedicated revenue on local 
funding of education to be positive. Estimates of the model 
which included Xg {State Dedicated Revenue/ADA) produced
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regression coefficients that were significant and between 
1.46 and 1.78. (See Appendix 5 for these results.) Con­
sistency was achieved regarding impact of state aid on 
local funding of education. Total state revenues per ADA 
stimulate local funding. The stimulative effect of state 
dedicated revenues is greater than the substitution effect 
of foundation and incentive aid. The net result is that 
total state revenues per ADA encourage local effort, thus 
improving resource allocation to education. Local school 
districts spend more for education with aid than without, 
and the external benefits of education are partially in­
ternalized. As suggested by the indifference curve analy­
sis proposed earlier, state matching grants caused decreased 
local spending for education, while the block grants in­
creased local effort.
Test of Hypothesis Three 
The testing of the third and fourth hypotheses was 
more straightforward than that of the first and second. The 
third hypothesis is; fiscal neutrality does not exist in 
Oklahoma with regard to educational spending per child. 
Fiscal neutrality means that the wealth of the school dis­
trict of residence and the educational spending per student 
are not related. The model for testing hypothesis three is 
as follows.
75
where
bg = constant term
= regression coefficient of 
^io ~ Value of Property/ADA
= Total Educational Revenue/ADA
The hypothesis test was set up as follows.
«0= Mo = °
®A= Mo  ^
The above model was estimated with data for the 623 
public school districts of Oklahoma in fiscal 1976. The 
results of the regression are shown in equation (5-17).
(5-17) Y = 821.649 + 0.0031 X'
(36.79) ^2 . 0.82792
The hypothesis test was done at the 0.05 signifi­
cance level for the 623 observations. The significance of 
^io a t score with absolute value greater than or
equal to 1.96. The null hypothesis was refuted with the 
empirical evidence of equation (5-17). Fiscal neutrality 
does not exist in Oklahoma with regard to educational spend­
ing per child. There is a relationship, a positive one, 
between spending per student and the wealth of the district 
in which the student resides. Thus, the educational funding 
system in Oklahoma is suspect in regard to fiscal neutrality.
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■ Test of Hypothesis Four 
The fourth hypothesis dealt with the impact of state 
funding of education on the equality of education oppor­
tunity. Using total educational aid per ADA as the depen­
dent variable and market value of property per ADA as the 
independent variable a test is available. If equality of 
educational funding per student is enhanced by state aid, 
then property value per ADA and total state revenue per ADA 
must be negatively related. The model used to test the 
fourth hypothesis was equation (5-18).
(5-18) Ï3 = bj' + b'-X'^ + «
where
b y  = constant term 
^10 ~ regression coefficient for 
= Market Value of Property/ADA 
= Xg = Total State Aid to Education/ADA
The hypothesis test was as follows:
‘=11 - ° 
"a= *>11 '
Regression results of model (5-18) are summarized
below.
(5-19) y = 498.65 - 0.0031 X ’
(-4.87) 5
R = 0.31409
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Hypothesis testing done for the 623 observations 
and a significance level of 0.05 required a tscore - ± 1.96 
for significance. The regression coefficient for the 
variable was negative and significant. The null hypothesis 
was rejected; equality of education spending is enhanced 
by state aid to education.
Testing of hypotheses three and four produced the 
following results. Quality of education per student, de­
fined as total revenue per student in ADA, is dependent on 
district wealth. However, state aid makes educational reve­
nue per student more equal. There is a relationship between 
quality of education and district wealth, but state aid 
payments go more heavily in the direction of less wealthy 
areas of the state.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, there has been a growing concern 
for the funding of public education, especially the impact 
of intergovernmental transfers. This work focused on two 
important facets of intergovernmental grants. The first 
involved the impact of state aid on resource allocation to 
education. A second issue focused on equality of educa­
tional opportunity.
The initial thrust of this study centered on the 
notion that education is a good purchased at the school 
district level, but with benefits that spill over school 
district boundaries. Without internalization of these ex­
ternal benefits, resources get under-allocated to education. 
To remedy this malady, federal and state governments offer 
aid to local school districts. The purpose of this inter­
governmental aid is to encourage local districts to increase 
purchases of education.
The efficient resource allocation to education ques­
tion led to the testing of two hypotheses. First, state 
aid to education encourages local spending on education in
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Oklahoma. The purpose of this hypothesis was to formalize 
an empirical test for the overall effect of state revenues 
on local funding. Had stimulation been the conclusion of 
hypothesis test one, then resource allocation to education 
was improved by state grants. A substitution conclusion 
for the test of hypothesis one was interpreted as unimproved 
allocation of resources to education resulting from state 
monies. A second, two-part, hypothesis was designed to de­
termine the component(s) that produced the stimulation of 
or substitution for local effort. The first part of hypo­
thesis two was: foundation aid encourages local spending
for education. The final part of hypothesis two was: in­
centive aid discourages local spending for education. A 
test of the second hypothesis was to allow an evaluation 
of state educational funding on the basis of the resource 
allocation criterion. Stimulative characteristics got high 
marks for improved allocation. Substitution tendencies 
produced low marks for allocation improvement.
Statistical testing of the first and second hypo­
theses proceeded with multiple linear regression by ordinary 
least-squares. Multicollinearity was severe between some 
of the independent variables involved in testing the second 
hypothesis. Corrections for the multicollinearity were 
handled by estimating the model with a partial variables 
list. Regression results allowed an acceptance of hypothesis 
one: total state aid to education stimulates local funding
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of education in Oklahoma. The first part of hypothesis two 
was rejected: foundation aid does not encourage local fund­
ing of education in Oklahoma. Part two of the second hypo­
thesis was accepted: incentive aid discourages local funding
of education in Oklahoma.
Total state educational revenues stimulate local fund­
ing for education. Thus, a more desirable allocation of re­
sources to education is accomplished via state funding in 
Oklahoma. Goal number six of the Oklahoma School Code is 
met by local funding being encouraged by state revenues.
Both foundation and incentive aid substitute for local spend­
ing, and thus discourage educational funding from local 
sources. The stimulation of local spending is done via 
state dedicated revenue.
Foundation aid was substituted for local spending 
for education. Foundation aid depends directly on ADA and 
indirectly on local ability to collect revenue, i.e., net 
assessed value of property. More foundation aid is avrarded 
to a school district as a result of more students in ADA, 
ceteris paribus. As the ability to finance education locally 
increases, the dollars charged against a district's founda­
tion aid increase, and the foundation grant is reduced.
This close inverse relationship between a district's ability 
to collect local funds and its propensity to receive founda­
tion aid encourages local districts to substitute state 
spending for local effort.
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Incentive aid was substituted for local spending 
and, thus, discouraged local educational funding. Reverse 
matching tendencies were viewed for incentive aid, prior to 
statistical testing, i.e., districts received incentive aid 
penalties for high levels of net assessed property valua­
tion. It was not surprising that incentive aid discouraged 
local effort. This tendency for incentive aid to discourage 
local funding of education in Oklahoma should force a re­
examination of the incentive aid formula or a renaming. As 
now written, the incentive aid formula should be referred 
to as disincentive aid. The only incentive in fiscal 1976 
was for school districts to vote over fifteen mills of 
property tax. No incentive aid is received, unless property 
tax millage is greater than fifteen. The greater the mills 
levied over fifteen, the more incentive aid is paid to the 
district. (See state aid formula in Appendix 6.) Virtually 
all school districts voted the maximum in fiscal 1976, 
thirty-five mills. The mechanism, used to adjust local pro­
perty tax effort was the assessment ratio. To get the most 
state aid from a given amount of local effort, the locality 
voted thirty-five mills of property tax, but kept its tax 
payments at the desired level by adjusting assessment ratios. 
Under the system prevailing in 1975-76, incentive aid did 
not reward local effort. All the incentive aid formula en­
couraged was a thirty-five mill tax levy and unequal assess­
ment ratios. Property tax equalization has been, recently.
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strengthened by the Oklahoma Supreme Court and could make 
the incentive aid formula work better. (See Appendix 7 for 
a brief explanation of this recent ruling involving equal­
ized assessments.) With more equal assessment rates, an 
incentive to vote millage over fifteen would encourage 
larger local support of public education.
The second major issue addressed by this work was 
equalization of educational opportunity. Spending per child 
was employed to measure quality of education, thus by­
passing the issue of what is being equalized. The conflict 
of the right of a United States citizen to equal educational 
opportunity centers on fiscal neutrality. The fiscal neu­
trality doctrine states that dollars spent on education per 
child should not be a function of the wealth of the district 
in vjhich the child resides. Fiscal neutrality has been 
limited to state boundaries by the courts.
The equalization of educational opportunity contro­
versy motivated the testing of a third and fourth hypothe­
sis. The third hypothesis was: fiscal neutrality does not
exist in Oklahoma with regard to educational spending per 
child. The purpose of this hypothesis was to determine 
whether or not educational funding in Oklahoma discriminates 
against students living in poorer districts. A regression 
of total education revenue per ADA on real value of property 
per ADA was performed. These results precipitated the con­
clusion that district wealth and spending per student were
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positively related in Oklahoma. Thus, the third hypothesis 
was accepted. Fiscal neutrality does not exist in Oklahoma 
with regard to educational spending per child.
Even though revenue per student in ADA is positively 
related to property wealth, the question of the intergov­
ernmental impact of state funds remained. To test impact 
of state funds on equality of revenue per student, a fourth 
hypothesis was employed: equality of educational spending
is enhanced by state aid in Oklahoma. Regressions of total 
state education revenue per ADA on real value of property 
per ADA were performed. State educational revenue per 
student was negatively related to wealth. Larger amounts 
of state revenues go to less v/ealthy districts, thus the 
fourth hypothesis was accepted. Equality of educational 
spending is enhanced by state aid in Oklahoma.
The last two hypotheses and their tests suggested 
recommendations for Oklahoma. Expenditures for education 
per student are positively related to district wealth. 
Discrimination exists in Oklahoma with regard to educational 
opportunity. Children living in less wealthy areas are pen­
alized by receiving an inferior education. State aid does 
not lessen educational equality, but it does not entirely 
correct it. Concern has been shown in the last few years 
by the Oklahoma Legislature and the Governor in this regard. 
Attention has been focused on these problems through Serrano 
V. Priest-type litigation. To avoid problems in the future.
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the Oklahoma system of funding education should be thor­
oughly reviewed. Specific recommendations should be made 
and implemented which would correct the discriminate fund­
ing of education in Oklahoma. In particular, state dedi­
cated revenue could be dealt with differently. Currently, 
dedicated revenue is returned to the district in which it 
is collected, although not dollar for dollar. Since wealth 
and state dedicated revenue for a district are related pos­
itively, this component of state payments to local districts 
enforces the tying of expenditures per student to district 
wealth.
A straightforward solution to the discrimination 
problem may not lie in revising state dedicated revenue 
grants. State dedicated revenue was the only component of 
state educational funding that improved resource allocation 
to education. Reducing wealth discrimination in funding 
education via state dedicated revenues may adversely affect 
resource allocation.
Recommendations for future research in the area of 
the grants economy, especially in Oklahoma include the need 
for better school district data. The school district in 
Oklahoma is a political subdivision for which little rele­
vant data are available, except for numbers used specif­
ically by the Oklahoma State Department of Education.
County data were used for lack of school district per­
sonal income and population numbers. To facilitate
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empirical work on intergovernmental grants, Oklahoma needs 
more complete data for school districts.
This study attempted to discern internal economies 
and diseconomies of scale. This effort was not useful; 
the way economies were put into the regression model the 
coefficients of regression for relevant variables were not 
significant. Other studies are called for before anything 
definitive can be said about economies of scale in public 
education for Oklahoma.
Some attention was focused on the possible relation­
ship between a mean school district size variable and foun­
dation aid. The mean school district size per county vari­
able was not significant in the model used to test the 
second hypothesis. Severe multicollinearity and heterosca- 
dasticity were ruled out, but further investigation was 
suggested.
Fertile ground for further study lies in the impact 
of intergovernmental grants on non-aided public goods. This 
problem has not been addressed in Oklahoma, and few have 
attempted it with other systems.
A better understanding of the Oklahoma system of 
financing education could be aided by better data at the 
school district level. In terms of statutory objectives 
the current system of state aid is reasonably appropriate, 
but could be improved considerably. It was empirically 
shown that state revenues stimulate local spending for
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education and help equalize expenditures per student. State 
dedicated revenues exacerbated the equalization objective 
and should be revised, unless this revision would adversely 
affect resource allocation to education. Incentive aid had 
a substitution effect on local spending for education, thus 
it should be renamed or its formula rewritten.
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ENGROSSED HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 1041
BY: POULOS, THOMPSON (Don), BENNETT, HOLT, McCALEB, DUKE,
LANCASTER, DRAPER, CRAID and HOLADAY
A JOINT RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE TO REFER TO THE PEOPLE FOR THEIR APPROVAL 
• OR REJECTION A  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 12a 
OF ARTICLE X OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION MODI­
FYING MANNER OF DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN TAXES 
COLLECTED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE COMMON 
SCHOOLS; CREATING THE STATE PUBLIC SCHOOL EQUAL­
IZATION FUND; PROVIDING ADDITIONAL TAX SOURCES 
FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND; PROVID­
ING A BALLOT TITLE; AND DIRECTING FILING.
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE AND THE SENATE 
OF THE 2ND SESSION OF THE 36TH OKLAHOMA LEGISLATURE:
SECTION 1. The secretary of State shall refer to 
the people for their approval or rejection, as and in the 
manner provided .by law, the following proposed amendment to 
Section 12a of Article X of the Constitution of the State 
of Oklahoma, to read as follows.
Section 12a. All taxes collected for the mainten­
ance support of the common schools of this state, which 
shall not include sinking fund tax collections for debt 
issued pursuant to Article 10, Sections 9B and 26 of the 
Constitution of Oklahoma, and v;hich are levied upon the 
property of any railroad company, pipe-line pipeline company,
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telegraph company, or upon the property of any public ser­
vice corporation or utility cooperative which operates in 
more than one county in this state, shall, after July 1,
1981, be paid into the eoRmen-Sehool-FuBd-end-disferibufced 
as-are-efeher-eommeii-Scheei-Funds-ef-fchis-sfeafce State Public 
School Equalization Fund and shall be apportioned to school 
districts according to the average daily attendance of the 
students of the school district.
SECTION 2. The Ballot Title for the proposed Con­
stitutional amendment as set forth in SECTION 1 of this 
Resolution shall be in the following form:
BALLOT TITLE
Legislative Referendum No. ____  State Question No. ____
THE GIST OF THE PROPOSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:
Shall a Constitutional ejnendment
amending Section 12a of Article X of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, which requires taxes collected for 
maintenance of common schools, which are assessed 
on the property of certain public service corpora­
tions or utility cooperatives operating in more 
than one county, and be paid into a Common School 
Fund and distributed as are other Common School 
Funds of this state, by abolishing the Common School 
Fund and creating the State Public School Equaliza­
tion Fund and requiring that taxes which are col­
lected for the support of common schools, excluding
Ill
sinking fund tax collections for debt issued pur­
suant to Article 10/ Sections 9B and 26 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, and assessed on such public 
service corporations be paid into a State Public 
School Equalization Fund and apportioned to school 
districts according to the average daily attendance 
of the students of such school districts 
be approved by the People?
SHALL THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT BE APPROVED?
[2]YES, FOR THE AMENDMENT 
I INO, AGAINST THE AMENDMENT
SECTION 3. The Speaker of the House of Representa­
tives shall , immediately after the effect date of this Reso­
lution, prepare and file one copy thereof, including the 
Ballot Title set forth in SECTION 2 hereof, with the Secre­
tary of State and one copy with the Attorney General.
Passed the House of Representatives the 13th day of 
February, 1978.
Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Passed the Senate the ' day o f .........  , 1978.
President of the Senate.
Appendix 2
The Farrar-Glauber test involves computing an F- 
statistic within the independent variables and evaluating 
the relative size of the F-statistic to judge severity of 
multicollinearity. The size of the F-statistic and sever­
ity of multicollinearity are positively related. The F- 
statistic within X (the independent variables) is computed 
by the following formula.
^X^ (n-1, N-n) = (R^ / 1 - P.^  ) (N-n/n-1) ,
i i
where
2
R = squared multiple correlation between X. and 
i the other members of X
N = sample size
n = number of independent variables.
A Farrar-Glauber test was done with the following
model.
^10^10 ^
See equation (5-1), Chapter 5 for the designations of vari­
ables relevant above.
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The resulting F values used to judge severity of 
multicollinearity for equation (5-1) appear below.
 ^ =^2 ==3
Fy (6/70) = Income Density ADA/Pop. 
i 19.0 5.3 3.2
X4 X; X,
Enroll. Gr. Federal Aid State Rev. 
6.7 6.2 8.9
^10
Property Value 
17.6
Stable relationships were concluded for X^, X^/ X^, 
Xg/ and Xg. Moderately severe multicollinearity was judged 
for X^ and X^^.
Source: Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber/
"Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem
Revisited," Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (February 
1967): 102-105.
Appendix 3
A factor analysis was performed for seventy-seven 
cases (counties) for sixteen variables. The sixteen vari­
ables are those worked with throughout Chapter five;
= Personal Income/Population
X. = Average Daily Attendance/Number of School 
Districts per County
= Mean ADA/Number of School Districts per County, 
when above 1,200
X. = Mean ADA/Number of School Districts per County, 
when 601 to 1,200
Xjp = Mean ADA/Number of School Districts per County, 
when below 601
X^ = Average Daily Attendance/1,000 Population
Y = (1975-76 Enrollment - 1970-71 Enrollment)
4 1970-71 Enrollment
Xg = Federal Aid to Education/ADA
Xg = State Foundation Aid/ADA
X^ = State Incentive Aid/ADA
Xg = State Dedicated Revenue/ADA
Xg = Total State Aid to Education/ADA
Xg = Total State Aid to Education/ADA (Allocated)
X^Q = Market Value of Property/Population
X^g^ = Market Value of Personal and Real Property/Pop.
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X . ~ Market Value of Public Service Property/Pop.XÜB
Factor groupings were as follows with an interpre­
tation of the factors.
Factor Interpretations
Factor 1: Ability to finance education locally.
Positive were wealth, income, and dedi­
cated revenue. Negative were federal 
aid, foundation aid, and incentive aid.
• Factor 2: Student density.
Factor 3: State aid total.
Factor 4; ADA Growth (Moderate and Small ADA dis­
tricts) .
Factor 5: ADA/1,000 population (negative).
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Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
-^5
-='7
"=8
^2B
-='2C
-%3
*10
*10A
*10B
Notice that interrelationships were not great between 
variables except for those in factor one. Income, wealth, 
federal aid, and the individual components of state aid were 
highly multicollinear.
model.
Appendix 4
A Farrar-Glauber test was done on the following
I'l = + b^ X, + bjXj + b,X, + bjXj + b^ Xg
+ b?*? + ^8*8 + bl0%10 + “
See Chapter 5, equation (5-11) for variable designations.
See Appendix 2 for the relevant formula and its explanation.
The F-statistics within X (the independent variables) 
can be used to measure each explanatory variable's depen-' 
dence on other members of the set. The resulting F values 
from which severity of multicollinearity was judged for 
equation (5-11) appear below. The higher value of the F- 
statistic the more severe the multicollinearity.
Xi Xj Xj
F„ (8,68) = Income Density ADA/Pop. Enroll. Gr.
i 26.2 3.9 7.6 4.8
==5 ==6 7^
Fed. Aid Found. Aid Incentive Aid 
6.3 106.2 105.1
^8 *10
Ded. Rev. Prop. Value
20.3 33.9
Relatively stable were variables X^, X^, X^, X^.
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Moderately affected by multicollinearity were Xg, and 
X^Q. Severely multicollinear were Xg and X^.
Appendix 5
Regression results which include the variable for 
state dedicated revenue are illustrated below.
y, = - 321.097 + 0.093 X, - 0.018 X - 0.35 X.
(4.14) (-1.05)^ (-0.49) ^
- 5.92 X. - 0.636 X + 0.905 X + 1.775 X
(-2.79)4 (-1.74)  ^ (1.65)  ^ (7.80) ^
R^ = 0.88231
where
X^ = Personal Income/Population
Xg = Average Daily Attendance/Number of School 
Districts per County
Xg = Average Daily Attendance/1/000 Population
X = (^^75-76 Enrollment - 1970-71 Enrollment)
4 1970-71 Enrollment
Xg = Federal Aid to Education/ADA
Xg = State Foundation Aid/ADA
Xg = State Dedicated Revenue/ADA
y^ = Local Educational Revenue/ADA.
y' = 39.233 + 0.051 X^ - 0.019 X + 0.821 X 
(2.54) (-1.11) (1.13)
- 4.80 X. - 0.306 Xc - 1.563 X_ + 1.455 X
(-2.22) (-0.85) (-1.84) (6.10)
2
where y^ = Local Assessment Ratio, R = 0.88345.
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Appendix 6
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
FINANCE DIVISION 
STATE AID
1975-1976 
Murl Venard, Administrator
The following is the formula, as provided by law, 
used in the calculating of Foundation and Incentive Aid.
It reflects the correct amounts and factors in use today. 
The two equalizing factors in the formula are:
(1) The chargeable income in the Foundation Aid 
section. This reflects the districts ability to 
support itself at home.
(2) The district wealth ratio in the Incentive Aid 
section. This reflects the school districts valu­
ation per ADA in relation to the State valuation 
per ADA.
FORM FOR CALCULATING STATE AID 
FOUNDATION AID
(1) Elem. ADA ___________ X $275 = $
(2) Sec. ADA _ _ _ _ _ _ _  X $330 = $
(3) Line 3 Total $
SUBTRACT CHARGEABLE INCOME
(4) .1974 Net Assessed Val. X 15 Mills
 (valuation) X , 015 = $ _ _
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1973-1974 Collections of;
(5) 75% of County 4 mill $
(6) Auto License $
(7; School Land $
(8) Gross Production $
(9) Rural Electric Coop. Tax $
(10) Line 10 Total $
(11) Line 11 (Line 3 Total
Minus Line 10) = $
ADD THE FOLLOWING
(12) Transportation:
(Average Daily Haul X Per Capita) 
___________________________  X   =  $
(13) Special Education:
______________ programs X $5000 = $
(14) Vocational Programs
___________  Vo. Ag. X $3980 = $
____________ Other X $2500 = $
(15) , TOTAL $
Foundation Aid = Line 11 Plus
Line 15 = $
INCENTIVE AID
(1) District Valuation divided by District ADA = 
District Valuation per ADA.
(2) District Valuation per ADA divided by 8,007 = 
District Wealth Ratio.
(3) District Wealth Ratio X .553 = Local Support Ratio.
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(4) 1.0000 - Local Support Ratio = State Support Ratio.
(Min. .4150 Max. .8350)
(5) State Average Support per mill (8.007) divided by
.553 = Support Level (14.48)
(6) 14.48 X State Ratio = State Support per mill.
(7) State Support per mill X mills levied above 15 =
Matching Grant.
(8) Matching Grant X Dist. ADA = Incentive Aid $  _____
Total State Aid $
Source : 1975-76 Annual Report, Oklahoma State De­
partment of Education by Leslie Fisher, State Superinten­
dent of Public Instruction (Oklahoma City: Allied Printers
and Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 4.
Appendix 7
1. Use 30% as an assessment rate for public service
property in Oklahoma for fiscal 1976. (This assess­
ing is done by the Oklahoma Tax Commission and is 
more consistently done than the locally assessed 
property.)
2 . The Board of Equalization set 12% as an equalized 
assessment rate, and on March 30, 1976, the Okla­
homa Supreme Court modified this 12% rate. (a) The 
Supreme Court allowed a variance of - 3% from the 
12%. (b) A three year period was given to get
assessments set. (Copies of documents in this re­
gard were mailed to the writer.)
3. The ratio study done by Professional Appraisal Com­
pany, 1975, was criticized by the Board of Equali­
zation, due to the failure to employ use value in 
the study.
4. Mr. Merrill mailed a copy of the average assessment
rates for Oklahoma counties, 1976. (See Appendix 8
for these figures.) (a) These averages were com­
puted by Oklahoma Tax Commission staff, but based 
on the following: State of Oklahoma Ratio Study
1975, Oklahoma Tax Commission by Professional 
Appraisal Company (Valuation Consultants), November 
5, 1975. (b) These figures were widely circulated
at the State Capitol; the writer received a copy 
from Tom A. Campbell, Oklahoma State Department of 
Education, October 27, 1976.
Source: Interview with J. L. Merrill, Oklahoma Tax
Commission, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 13 March 1978.
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Appendix 8
AVERAGE ASSESSrffiNT RATES FOR LOCALLY ASSESSED PROPERTY, 
BY COUNTY BASED ON MEAN ASSESSMENT RATES 
ESTIMATED BY PROFESSIONAL APPRAISERS:
OKLAHOMA, 1976
Present
Average
Assessment
Present
Average
Assessment
No. County Rate No. County Rate
1. Adair 4.48 21. Delaware 6.23
2. Alfalfa 8.42 22. Dewey 4.86
3. Atoka 3.91 23. Ellis 10.37
4. Beaver 11.08 24. Garfield 10.79
5. Beckham 8.72 25. Garvin 7.46
6. Blaine 7.22 26. Grady 6.87
7. Bryan 4.89 27. Grant 7.17
8. Caddo 8.00 28. Greer 8.30
9. Canadian 9,98 29. Harmon 7.16
10. Carter 10.29 30. Harper 9.81
11. Cherokee 5.30 31. Haskell 7.07
12. Choctaw 10.12 32. Hughes 5.60
13. Cimarron 9.15 33. Jackson 9.19
14. Cleveland 12.95 34. Jefferson 6.71
15. Coal 5.10 35. Johnston 5.01
16. Comanche 11.91 36. Kay 9.66
17. Cotton 8.16 37. Kingfisher 8.96
18. Craig 5.92 38. Kiowa 7.49
19. Creek 8.43 39. Latimer 7.84
20. Custer 8.71 40. Leflore 9.45
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AVERAGE ASSESSMENT RATES (Cont'd.)
NO. County
Present
Average
Assessment
Rate No. County
Present
Average
Assessment
Rate
41. Lincoln 4.82 60. Payne 9.39
42. Logan 6.93 61. Pittsburg 8.79
43. Love 4.79 62. Pontotoc 7.07
44. McClain 6.24 63. Pottawatomie 10.26
45. McCurtain 8.02 64. Pushmataha 8.55
46. McIntosh 4.21 65. Roger Mills 5.42
47. Major 6.83 66. Rogers 6.93
48. Marshall 4.76 67. Seminole 10.00
49. Mayes 6.31 68. Sequoyah 5.02
50. Murray 6.64 69. Stephens 8.64
51. Muskogee 10.04 70. Texas 10,36
52. Noble 8.46 71. Tillman 10.11
53. Nowata 6.03 72. Tulsa 17.91
54. Okfuskee 5.36 73. Wagoner 6.20
55. Oklahoma 15.53 74. Washington 11.37
56. Okmulgee 9.10 75. Washita 7.88
57. Osage 8.14 76. Woods 5.88
58. Ottawa 10,49 77. Woodward 12.74
59. Pawnee 7.78
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Appendix 9
FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN OKLAHOMA, 1975-76: 
MATCHED V. NON MATCHED 
(Rounded to Nearest $)
Federal Program of 
Educational Aid
Amount 
Of Funds 
Matched
Amount 
Of Funds 
Non Matched
Vocational Aid $2,425,723
Johnson O'Malley $ 1,124,073
Maintenance & Operation
PL 874, PL 815 13,437,993
School Lunch & Milk 24,204,975
Title I - ESEA 22,336,767
Title I - ESEA Migrant 872,577
Title II - ESEA 502,909
Title III - ESEA
Guidance & Counseling 44,126
Title III - ESEA Innovation 1,076,280
Title IV - B - ESEA 622,031
Title VI - ESEA, B, C, & G 1,448,467
Title III - NDEA 166,722
Title IV - lEA 3,809,108
Title VII - ESAA 1,845,125
Indochinese Refugee Assist.
Act, l e a 's 411,600
Indochinese Refugee Assist.
Act, Adult Education 36,436
Adult Education 920,722
TOTAL $3,513,167 $71,772,467
Source; Interview with Charles W. Sandmann,Oklahoma 
State Department of Education, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 25 
January 1978.
